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ABSTRACT 
QUANTIFYING IMPACT OF CYBER ACTIONS ON MISSIONS OR BUSINESS 
PROCESSES: A MULTILAYER PROPAGATIVE APPROACH 
 
Unal Tatar 
Old Dominion University, 2019 
Director: Dr. Adrian Gheorghe 
 
Ensuring the security of cyberspace is one of the most significant challenges of the modern 
world because of its complexity. As the cyber environment is getting more integrated with the real 
world, the direct impact of cybersecurity problems on actual business frequently occur. Therefore, 
operational and strategic decision makers in particular need to understand the cyber environment 
and its potential impact on business. Cyber risk has become a top agenda item for businesses all 
over the world and is listed as one of the most serious global risks with significant financial 
implications for businesses.  
Risk analysis is one of the primary tools used in this endeavor. Impact assessment, as an 
integral part of risk analysis, tries to estimate the possible damage of a cyber threat on business. It 
provides the main insight into risk prioritization as it incorporates business requirements into risk 
analysis for a better balance of security and usability. Moreover, impact assessment constitutes the 
main body of information flow between technical people and business leaders. Therefore, it 
requires the effective synergy of technological and business aspects of cybersecurity for protection 
against cyber threats. 
The purpose of this research is to develop a methodology to quantify the impact of 
cybersecurity events, incidents, and threats. The developed method addresses the issue of impact 
quantification from an interdependent system of systems point of view. The objectives of this 
research are (1) developing a quantitative model to determine the impact propagation within a 
   
 
layer of an enterprise (i.e., asset, service or business process layer); (2) developing a quantitative 
model to determine the impact propagation among different layers within an enterprise; (3) 
developing an approach to estimate the economic cost of a cyber incident or event. 
Although there are various studies in cybersecurity risk quantification, only a few studies 
focus on impact assessment at the business process layer by considering ripple effects at both the 
horizontal and vertical layers. This research develops an approach that quantifies the economic 
impact of cyber incidents, events and threats to business processes by considering the horizontal 









































This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Irem and sons Levent and Bulent.  
I also dedicate this work to my parents. 
 
  




I would like to express my appreciation to my family, advisor, committee members and 
friends who provided intellectual and motivational support to make this dissertation possible. 
My family deserves endless gratitude. They showed great patience for my long periods of 
study and provided the best and most support.  
My advisor, Dr. Gheorghe –  Doctorvater, has always welcomed my ideas and provided 
his strong support to realize these ideas in the most efficient manner. My committee members, Dr. 
Pinto, Dr. Bahsi, and Dr. Daniels offered invaluable feedback on my research design. Dr. Sousa-
Poza’s guidance and mentorship were also priceless to create my research program.  
Whole ERI team and especially my dearest friends, Omer Keskin and Omer Poyraz, were 
encouraging by exchanging views on the progress of my study and strengthening my motivation.  
I would also like to express my deep sense of gratitude and sincere thanks to the 
Engineering Management and Systems Engineering Department and all its professors, faculty, 
staff and research assistants. I would not have been able to complete this research without 
encouraging and constructive environment provided by them.  




A  Availability 
AOD  Availability of Data 
APT  Advanced Persistent Threat 
BOL  Baseline Operability Level 
BOLP  Baseline Operability Level of Node P 
BP  Business Process 
C  Confidentiality 
COD  Criticality of Dependency 
CODP  Criticality of Dependency of Node P 
CAPT  Captain 
CIA  Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
CISO  Chief Information Security Officer 
$Cov  Insurance Coverage 
$Ctl  Cost of Control 
CPM  Critical Path Method 
CSES  Cyberspace Security Econometrics System 
$Ded  Insurance Deductible 
DDNA  Development Dependency Network Analysis 
DDoS  Distributed Denial of Service 
DNS  Domain Name System  
FDNA  Functional Dependency Network Analysis 
FIPS  Federal Information Processing Standards 
FISMA Federal Information Security Management Act 
FFDF   Failure Flow Decision Function 
GNSS   Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
I  Integrity 
IEC  International Electrotechnical Commission 
   
 
viii
IEEE  Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
$Imp  Cost of Impact 
IOD  Impact of Dependency 
IP  Internet Protocol 
ISO  International Organization for Standardization 
IT  Information Technology 
MOE  Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP  Measure of Performance 
NATO  The North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NIST  National Institute of Standards and Technology 
OBIMC Ontology Based Information Management Capability 
P  Operability 
PC  Personal Computer  
PERT  Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
PII  Personally Identifiable Information 
$Prm  Premium 
SE  Self-Efficiency 
SME  Subject Matter Experts 
SOD  Strength of Dependency 
SODA  Stochastic Operational functional Dependency Analysis 
SODP  Strength of Dependency of Node P 
SoS  System of Systems 
SDVF   Single Dimensional Value Function  
TTL  Time-to-Live 
V  Value 
w  Weight 
 
  
   
 
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ xv 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................... xvi 
Chapter 
1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Overview ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Definition of Key Concepts and Variables ..................................................................... 3 
1.3 Purpose of the Study ....................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Research Questions ......................................................................................................... 6 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 Introduction to Literature Review ................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Method of Literature Review ........................................................................................ 10 
2.3 Results of Analysis ....................................................................................................... 15 
2.3.1 General Results from the Analysis ............................................................................... 15 
2.3.2 Method of Study ........................................................................................................... 15 
2.3.3 Method of Validation .................................................................................................... 16 
2.3.4 Representation of Layers in Impact Assessment .......................................................... 18 
2.3.5 Representation of Dependencies Impact Propagation .................................................. 20 
2.3.6 Economics of Cybersecurity Risk and Impact .............................................................. 22 




2.3.7 Knowledge Gap ............................................................................................................ 23 
3 METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................... 27 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 27 
3.2 Expected Results and Criteria for Evaluating Results .................................................. 30 
3.2.1 Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) .................................................... 31 
3.2.1.1. Overview of FDNA................................................................................................... 31 
3.2.1.2. Previous Studies on FDNA ....................................................................................... 34 
3.2.1.3. Modifications to FDNA ............................................................................................ 46 
3.2.2 Economics of Cybersecurity and Risk .......................................................................... 47 
3.3 Generalizability and Validity of the Research .............................................................. 51 
3.3.1 Generalizability of Research ......................................................................................... 51 
3.3.2 Validity of Research ..................................................................................................... 52 
4 MODEL DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................... 55 
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 55 
4.2 Multiple Component FDNA Nodes .............................................................................. 55 
4.3 Applicability of FDNA Concepts into Cybersecurity ................................................... 59 
4.4 Modifications to FDNA to Develop FDNA-Cyber ...................................................... 61 
4.5.1. Self-Efficiency of Nodes........................................................................................... 62 
4.5.2. Integrating Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability .............................................. 63 




4.5.3. AND Gate Integration ............................................................................................... 76 
4.5.4. OR Gate Integration .................................................................................................. 83 
4.5 Cost Calculation Model ................................................................................................ 90 
4.5.1. Cost Factors for an Adverse Cyber Event ................................................................. 90 
4.5.2. Impact of Time and Duration to Cyber Cost ............................................................ 93 
4.5.3. Case Study: Economic Impact of a DDoS Attack Targeting a Higher Education 
Institute 93 
4.5.3.1. Background of Online Learning at Higher Education Institutes .............................. 93 
4.5.3.2. Research Problem ..................................................................................................... 94 
1.5.3.2.1. Model .................................................................................................................... 95 
4.5.3.3. Application of the model on distance learning data.................................................. 98 
4.5.3.3.1. Data collection and preparation ............................................................................ 98 
4.5.3.3.2. Simulation results................................................................................................ 103 
4.5.3.3.2.1. Risk acceptance ............................................................................................... 104 
4.5.3.3.2.2. Risk control ..................................................................................................... 104 
4.5.3.3.2.3. Risk transfer .................................................................................................... 104 
4.5.3.3.2.4. Comparison of risk mitigation strategies ........................................................ 105 
4.5.3.4. Limitations .............................................................................................................. 106 
4.5.3.5. Conclusions ............................................................................................................. 107 




4.5.4. Formula for Calculating Cost of a Cyber Action .................................................... 107 
5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS .................................................................................................. 110 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 110 
5.2 Case 1: Impact Propagation and Cost Calculation ...................................................... 110 
5.2.1 Build a simple 3-tier network to compare cost and impact difference as per the attacked 
asset(s) 110 
5.2.2 List effected assets/services/task/business processes .................................................. 112 
5.2.3 Cost graph for B1-4 .................................................................................................... 114 
5.2.4 Time/Duration impact ................................................................................................. 115 
5.3 Case 2: Redundancy – Resiliency ............................................................................... 117 
5.3.1 Most critical asset analysis.......................................................................................... 117 
5.3.1.1 Find most critical asset(s) (i.e. asset(s) having most impact) for each BP ............. 118 
5.3.1.1.1 Most critical assets in terms of causing loss of operability ................................ 118 
5.3.1.1.2 Most critical assets in terms of causing cost of loss ........................................... 119 
5.3.1.2 Scenarios where assets are randomly degraded ...................................................... 120 
5.3.2 Assess the impact of adding redundancy on resiliency .............................................. 121 
5.3.2.1 Add a redundant asset (i.e. an asset with the same functionality with OR gate) .... 121 
5.3.2.2 Add to A3 (A3.1 and A3.2) .................................................................................... 121 
5.3.2.3 Add to A1 (A1.1 and A1.2) .................................................................................... 123 




5.3.2.4 Compare the impact of adding a redundant node to A3 and A1 ............................. 124 
5.4 Case 3: Compare impact (cost) of attack and security/infrastructure investment scenarios
 126 
5.4.1 Change system configuration (add a redundant node) ................................................ 126 
5.4.2 Buy a security tool to prevent attack (Anti-virus, Host Based IDS etc.) .................... 126 
5.4.3 Comparison of mitigation strategies ........................................................................... 127 
5.5 Case 4: Risk Management Decision Making .............................................................. 129 
5.5.1 Risk management decision making ............................................................................ 129 
5.5.1.1 Risk acceptance ....................................................................................................... 129 
5.5.1.2 Risk avoidance ........................................................................................................ 130 
5.5.1.3 Risk control ............................................................................................................. 130 
5.5.1.4 Risk transfer (insurance) ......................................................................................... 130 
5.5.2 Scenarios for risk management strategies ................................................................... 130 
5.5.2.1 Risk acceptance ....................................................................................................... 131 
5.5.2.2 Risk control ............................................................................................................. 131 
5.5.2.3 Risk transfer ............................................................................................................ 132 
5.5.2.4 Risk control and risk transfer .................................................................................. 133 
5.5.3 Comparison of risk management strategies ................................................................ 133 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis .................................................................................................... 135 




6 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 141 
6.1 High Level Summary of Findings............................................................................... 141 
6.2 Significance of the Study ............................................................................................ 141 
6.3 Future Research .......................................................................................................... 145 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 146 
VITA ........................................................................................................................................... 157 
               
  
   
 
xv
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1. Results of Queries in IEEE Xplore and SCOPUS .................................................................... 11 
2. Analysis Items ........................................................................................................................... 14 
3. The detailed analysis of reviewed papers ................................................................................. 17 
4. Data for domicile, tuition rates, and types of courses ............................................................... 99 
5. 12-hour DDoS attack impact .................................................................................................. 101 
6. Risk Mitigation Strategy Costs ............................................................................................... 104 
7. Relation of potential consequences and cost factors ............................................................... 108 
8. List of affected nodes when each asset is degraded to zero one by one ................................. 113 
9. Business Process costs caused by degradation of each asset .................................................. 119 
10. Effect of adding a redundant node for A3 on total cost ........................................................ 123 
11. Effect of adding a redundant node for A1 on total cost ........................................................ 124 





   
 
xvi
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
1. Impact Dependency Graph ......................................................................................................... 3 
2. A taxonomy of Information security risk assessment approaches .............................................. 4 
3. Horizontal and Vertical Dependency of Layers ........................................................................ 20 
4. Research methodology .............................................................................................................. 29 
5. A Sample 4-Node FDNA Graph Topology .............................................................................. 31 
6. A 2-Node FDNA Graph ............................................................................................................ 33 
7. Capability Portfolio Context Representation of FDNA Graph ................................................. 34 
8. Iterative validation process ....................................................................................................... 53 
9. Representation of a constituent node ........................................................................................ 57 
10. Dependency Relations of Constituent Nodes and Single Nodes ............................................ 58 
11. A 2-Node FDNA Graph .......................................................................................................... 63 
12. An FDNA-Cyber node ............................................................................................................ 64 
13. A 2-node FDNA-Cyber graph ................................................................................................ 65 
14. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph ................................................................................................ 69 
15. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph ................................................................................................ 72 
16. AND dependency of a 3-node FDNA graph........................................................................... 76 
17. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with AND gate dependency ................................................... 78 
18. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with AND gate dependency ................................................... 80 
19. OR dependency of a 3-node FDNA graph .............................................................................. 84 
20. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with OR gate dependency ...................................................... 85 
21. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with OR gate dependency ...................................................... 87 




22. Cost factors of an adverse cyber event ................................................................................... 92 
23. The Mitigation Strategy Selection Algorithm......................................................................... 96 
24. Total number of distance learning courses for each day......................................................... 98 
25. Value of Stream for 15-minute periods for each day ............................................................ 100 
26. Direct impact of a 12-hour DDoS attack .............................................................................. 102 
27. Direct impact of a 72-hour DDoS attack .............................................................................. 103 
28. Cost of Impact and Mitigation Strategies ............................................................................. 106 
29. Sample 3-tier enterprise network .......................................................................................... 111 
30. Total cost caused by each failed asset ................................................................................... 114 
31. Total costs caused by CIA .................................................................................................... 115 
32. Total cost caused by each failed asset with a different time and duration ............................ 117 
33. Cumulative performance degradation of business process nodes… ..................................... 118 
34. Total cost caused by each failed group of assets .................................................................. 120 
35. Modified network with redundancy added for A3 ................................................................ 122 
36. Modified network with redundancy added for A1 ................................................................ 123 
37. Total cost caused by each failed asset and redundant nodes ................................................ 125 
38. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the full degradation scenarios
..................................................................................................................................................... 127 
39. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the redundancy scenarios
..................................................................................................................................................... 128 
40. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the redundancy scenarios 
with regards to CIA values ......................................................................................................... 129 




41. Total costs for risk acceptance strategy ................................................................................ 131 
42. Total costs for risk control strategy ...................................................................................... 132 
43. Comparison of risk management strategies .......................................................................... 134 
44 Cost of degradation of C-I-A values of Asset 1 to 4.............................................................. 136 
45 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 1 ................................................................................... 136 
46 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 2 ................................................................................... 137 
47 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 3 ................................................................................... 138 
48 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 4 ................................................................................... 138 
49 Operability levels of Confidentiality values of Assets A1 to A4 ........................................... 139 
50 Operability levels of Integrity values of Assets A1 to A4 ..................................................... 139 












Ensuring the security of cyberspace is one of the biggest challenges the modern world has 
been come across due to the complexity of the domain. Solutions to cybersecurity problems have 
to cover all aspects of the problem domain including technical, organizational, and human aspects. 
All individuals ranging from top-most strategic decision makers to ordinary computer users have 
particular responsibilities that cannot be delegated to others. Thus, the risk management notion of 
each individual is the most vital countermeasure to preserve cybersecurity. 
As the cyber security environment is getting more integrated with the real world, the direct 
impact of cybersecurity problems on real business frequently occur. Therefore, operational and 
strategic decision makers in particular need to understand the cyber environment and its potential 
impact on business. For instance, cyber infrastructures are heavily used in military operations. 
Commanders at different rankings must have the capability to figure out the effect of cyber threats 
to military operations and make decisions accordingly. 
Protection against cyber threats requires a holistic approach that should cover technology, 
business and human aspects of the problem domain. Impact assessment, which highly involves the 
harmonization of technological findings with business requirements, is a critical analysis task that 
commonly exists in risk, incident, event, or vulnerability management activities (Bahsi, Udokwu, 
Tatar, & Norta, 2018).  
Impact assessment, as an integral part of risk analysis, tries to estimate the possible damage 
of a cyber threat on a business or mission.  It provides the primary insight into risk prioritization 
as it incorporates the business or mission requirements into risk analysis for a better balancing of 




security and usability. Moreover, this assessment constitutes the main body of information flow 
between technical people and business leaders. Therefore, it requires effective harmonization of 
technological and business aspects of cybersecurity (Bahsi, et al., 2018). 
To calculate the impact of cyber incidents and events in a way that a senior level decision 
maker could comprehend, assessing the impact on mission or business processes is a better option 
than doing it at the asset or service level. The asset layer represents the information systems, the 
service layer shows the IT or business functions that can be performed by a group of assets, and 
the mission layer models the ongoing mission or business processes in the target organization(s)  
(Bahsi, et al., 2018).  
Accurate cyber impact assessment requires considering impact propagation at horizontal 
and vertical layers. The dependencies between the unit components of each layer are called 
horizontal dependencies. For instance, some studies consider a task as the unit of a mission and 
define the ordering requirements as horizontal dependencies at the mission layer. Vertical 
dependencies link the components belonging to different layers. Jakobson (2011) proposes an 
impact dependency graph as shown in Figure 1. 
Although there are many studies in cybersecurity risk quantification, only a few studies 









Figure 1. Impact Dependency Graph (adapted from Jakobson 2011) 
 
1.2 Definition of Key Concepts and Variables 
In this section, the key concepts used in this proposal are defined. Shameli-Sendi, 
Aghababaei-Barzegar, and Cheriet created a taxonomy for information security risk assessment 
methods as depicted in Figure 2 (Shameli-Sendi, Aghababaei-Barzegar, & Cheriet, 2016). Since 
the perspective (i.e. asset driven, service driven or business driven), resource valuation (i.e. vertical 
or horizontal) and risk measurement (i.e. non-propagated or propagated) are also used in 




quantification of cyber impact on missions or business processes, the definitions of these review 
papers are used.  
 
 
Figure 2. A taxonomy of Information security risk assessment approaches (Shameli-Sendi et al., 
2016) 
 
Definition 1: Asset layer is composed of software, hardware, data and people. In the asset 
driven approach, which is the most common in risk analysis, there are thousands of assets in a 
medium to large organization to be analyzed and maintained on a regular basis according to various 
risk scenarios (Jakobson, 2011; Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016). 





Definition 2: Service layer is comprised of services that rely on assets to enable tasks and 
missions. Internet connection, identity management, email and video conferencing are some of the 
services that can be available in an enterprise (Jakobson, 2011). In the service-driven perspective, 
“risks are identified and assessed based on their impact on the services” (Shameli-Sendi et al., 
2016). 
 
Definition 3: Mission layer is a higher level than asset and service layers. However, it 
relies on the other two layers. The mission layer is mostly used in military contexts. In the civilian 
domain, the business process layer is used to refer to the mission layer. These two terms are used 
interchangeably in this study (Jakobson, 2011). In the business process layer perspective, “values 
are not assigned to assets, but rather to processes that are directly linked to business goals” 
(Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016). 
 
Definition 4: The vertical view is defined as “a bottom-up view and it considers the 
resources’ contribution degree of a level in the upper level” (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016) as 
illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Definition 5: The horizontal view (Jakobson, 2011) is used to refer to “the dependencies 
between resources at the same level” ( Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016). 
 




In a non-propagated model, it is assumed that impact is not propagated to other resources 
within or among layers. In a propagated model the impact of the attack on the compromised 
resource propagates to other dependent resources (Jakobson, 2011; Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016). 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to develop a methodology to quantify the impact of 
cybersecurity events, incidents, and threats by considering the dependencies and propagation of 
impact within and among layers of assets, services, and business processes. The study will address 
the issue of impact quantification from a system of systems point of view.  
The objectives of the research are as follows. 
Objective 1: Develop a quantitative model to determine the impact propagation within a 
layer.  
Objective 2: Develop a quantitative model to determine the impact propagation among 
different layers within an enterprise.  
Objective 3: Develop an approach to estimate the economic cost of a cyber incident or 
event. 
1.4 Research Questions  
There are many studies and practical solutions to gauge the impact of a cyber incident. 
However, they are not fully capable of responding to strategic level decision makers’ needs 
especially in calculating the impact on business instead of an impact on targeted assets and 
assigning an economic value to impact. A novel attempt will be made to improve measurement of 
the impact of cyber incidents and events. The following questions are identified to frame this study. 




1. How can the intra-dependency within a layer (i.e., asset, service, and business process) be 
modeled? 
2. How can the inter-dependency among layers (i.e., asset, service, and business process) be 
modeled? 
3. How can the propagation of impact of cyber actions be modeled? 
4. How can the total economic impact of loss be modeled to identify an effective and 
efficient risk mitigation strategy? 
 
  





2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review, synthesize, and criticize the literature that 
describes what is known regarding the impact of cyber incidents and events on missions or 
business processes. The first section explains the aim of the literature review. In this section the 
questions explored during the literature review are listed. The second section accounts for the 
methodology used for a systematic literature review. The third section provides findings from the 
literature review, particularly the knowledge gap. 
Some parts of this chapter have been published in the author et.al.’s (2018) paper entitled 
“Impact Assessment of Cyber Actions on Missions or Business Processes: A Systematic Literature 
Review”. 
2.1 Introduction to Literature Review 
The impact assessment is a part of various preventive, detective and corrective cyber-
security tasks such as risk assessment, incident handling, or event monitoring. The impact of a 
threat is a critical analysis item in a risk assessment. The triage phase of an incident handling 
operation starts with the investigation of the damage caused by the incident. An event generated 
by security monitoring systems or a finding obtained in a vulnerability analysis is subject to an 
impact analysis to be adequately validated and prioritized. In this study, event, incident, and threat 
are covered by the term “cyber actions.”  
Various academic studies, which can be classified under topics such as situational 
awareness, dynamic risk analysis, mission impact analysis or cyber battle damage assessment, 
address the relationship between missions and impacts of cyber actions. In this study, the existing 
body of literature is reviewed to address the following questions:  




(1) Do the current studies represent mission, service and asset (information systems) 
layers? If so, what models do they use?  
(2) Do current studies represent the dependencies of the objects between different layers? 
Do they handle the dependencies in each layer? If so, what representation methods do they utilize?  
(3) What cyber actions trigger the impact assessment?  
(4) Do they consider the impact of confidentiality, integrity or availability related cyber 
actions?  
(5) Do they assess mission capability or economic consequences?  
(6) What application domains do they cover? 
(7) Do they handle multiple processes of one organization?  
(8) Do they bring a solution to the processes that involve multiple organizations?  
(9) What automation levels do they use for the data collection?  
(10) Do they conduct impact assessment during the planning or operational phase of the 
missions?  
(11) What validation methods do they utilize?  
(12) Do current studies assess the mission capability or economic consequences?  
(13) How is the Functional Dependency Network Analysis method used to model the 
interdependency of systems?  
 
Additionally, the following research questions are also addressed to deal with research 
gaps: (1) What research problems should the researchers address? (2) What approaches may 
provide a promising result for the identified problems?                 




Franke and Brynielsson (2014) present a comprehensive review of the literature regarding 
cyber situational awareness. Cherdantseva et al. (2016) review the risk assessment methods that 
address SCADA systems. However, these studies do not focus on impacts and their relations to 
missions in a detailed way. Kott, Ludwig and Lange (2017) analyze two studies that conduct 
mission impact assessment and identify some research challenges in the field. Although it does not 
include a systematic review of the literature, the discussion about the modeling of attackers and 
defenders is noteworthy. This literature review is unique as it systematically reviews the relevant 
literature and profoundly explores impact propagation of cyber actions between IT systems and 
missions in the analyzed studies.  
2.2 Method of Literature Review 
The literature review is narrowed to papers that utilize the mission flows as the subject of 
the impact analysis. Therefore, the studies that establish links between cyber actions and missions 
and evaluate the propagation of impact and determine the consequences are included.  The 
identification of relevant papers was done in three steps: (a) running keyword queries on academic 
databases, (b) removing irrelevant papers by manually reviewing the meta-data, (c) selecting the 
appropriate ones by reading the relevant parts of the papers.  
The following keywords are used: mission impact assessment, battle damage assessment, 
situational awareness and risk management. As the review subject is the impact of cyber actions 
on missions or business processes, the terms "cyber," "mission," and "business" are added to the 
search queries as shown in Table 1. The term, “damage assessment” is accompanied by only 
“cyber” as this term has a specific meaning that does not further clarification. A query is run 
through all the publications in the IEEE Xplore and journal papers in the SCOPUS databases. 
Additionally, all the papers published in “Proceedings of the NATO IST128 Workshop Assessing 




Mission Impact of Cyberattacks” are included since the scope of the workshop exactly resonates 
with this review’s subject.  
The column of Table 1 called “search result” gives the number of publications identified 
by the queries that are applied to only metadata such as abstract, title and keywords. After 
collecting the papers, the abstract of each paper is examined to understand whether it is relevant 
for further analysis. The column called "manual review result" gives the number of papers obtained 
after this filtering study. Search queries yielded 773 papers, and the manual reviews of metadata 
decreased it to 133. The removal of duplications resulted in a set of 76. After scrutinizing all these 
papers and eliminating those that do not fit the outlined criteria, 22 studies remained for detailed 
analysis. If one author or the same research team published a more mature paper as a continuation 
of their previous work, then it is also covered in the analysis.  
 
Table 1. Results of Queries in IEEE Xplore and SCOPUS 
Search Query IEEE Xplore (all publications) 















"cyber" + "impact" + "mission" 60 30 10 5 
"cyber" + "impact" + "business" 98 16 114 6 
"cyber" + "damage assessment" 38 10 4 2 
"cyber" + "situational awareness" + 
"mission" 18 9 8 1 
"cyber" + "situational awareness" + 
"business" 25 6 7 5 
"cyber" + "risk" + "mission" 51 20 15 3 
"cyber" + "risk" + "business" 157 16 168 4 
Total Number 447 107 326 26 
 





Some studies introduce impact assessment based on the value of information- and system 
assets. If a study does not derive those values by considering the mission, or relevant factors, then 
it is assumed that the study does not provide a link between cyber actions and missions; thus, it is 
not included in the analysis. The studies regarding the security of cyber-physical systems that 
investigate the interactions between cyber- and physical components are reviewed and then the 
impacts on physical components are related to failures in business functions. Some of the papers 
quantify the impact of cyber actions in economic terms such as monetary loss without a systematic 
analysis of business flows. They are also analyzed since the loss is somehow related to the 
missions. 
Table 2 gives the analysis items that are used in this study.  A set of categorical values is 
determined for each item. After reviewing each paper, the relevant value that mostly describes the 
contribution is selected.  
Definition 6:  Cyber actions can be a threat, incident or event.  
Definition 7: If the expression of the action primarily includes attack vector terms, it is 
classified as a threat.   
Definition 8: Incident means that the object of impact assessment is a case that most likely 
ends up with cybersecurity damage.  
Definition 9: The event category is assigned to the studies that process the security events 
generated by monitoring systems or vulnerability scanners. The application domain gives 
information about the type of organization from which the case studies or examples are selected.  




The impact of cyber actions on information system assets is assessed according to the 
security properties, confidentiality, integrity, and availability whereas the impact on missions is 
classified by using two categories, mission capability and economic.  
Definition 10: Confidentiality is “preserving authorized restrictions on information 
access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary 
information” (NIST SP 800-122). 
Definition 11: Integrity is “the security objective that generates the requirement for 
protection against either intentional or accidental attempts to violate data integrity (the property 
that data has not been altered in an unauthorized manner) or system integrity (the quality that a 
system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from 
unauthorized manipulation)” (NIST SP 800-33). 
Definition 12: Availability is “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information. Note: Mission/business resiliency objectives extend the concept of availability to 
refer to a point-in-time availability (i.e., the system, component, or device is usable when needed) 
and the continuity of availability (i.e., the system, component, or device remains usable for the 
duration of the time it is needed)” (NIST SP 800-160). 
Definition 13: Mission capability refers to restrictions imposed on mission resources or 
outputs due to the occurrence of cyber actions.  
Definition 14: Economic impact category labels the studies that measure the 
consequences according to monetary losses. Assessment layers provide the main framework for 
the formulation and modeling of impact propagation from the information system assets to 
missions. The asset layer represents the information systems, the service layer shows the IT or 
business functions that can be performed by a group of assets, and the mission layer models the 




ongoing mission or business processes in target organization(s). The dependencies between the 
unit components of each layer are called horizontal. For instance, some studies consider a task as 
the unit of a mission and define the ordering requirements as horizontal dependencies at the 
mission layer. Vertical dependencies link the components belonging to different layers. Jakobson 
(2011) proposes an impact dependency graph as shown in Figure 1. This structure is chosen as a 
reference framework for the evaluation of assessment layers and horizontal/vertical dependencies 
as it provides a comprehensive view for layers and their dependencies and additionally includes 
the service layer that may act as a significant facilitator for covering complex IT systems and a 
multitude of missions belonging to one or more organizations. 
Table 2. Analysis Items 
Analysis Items Categorical Values 
Cyber Actions Threat, Incident, Event 
Application Domain Military, Enterprise, Cyber-physical Systems, 
Cloud Computing 
Impact on Mission Mission Capability, Economic Impact 
Impact on Information 
System Assets 
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability 
Assessment Layers Mission, Service, Asset 
Dependency Horizontal, Vertical 
Number of Processes Multiple, One 
Number of Organizations Multiple, One 
Data Collection Partially Automatic, Manual 
Phase of the Mission Planning, Operational 
Method of the Study No Validation, Simulation, Case Study, 
Deployment to a Test/Live Environment 
 
The number of organizations and processes handled in the case studies, examples or 
experiments are also examined. The data collection method is classified as manual if it relies 
entirely on the extraction of expert knowledge without the help of any automation means. The 




method is considered partially automatic when it employs the combination of human intervention 
and automatic procedures. If the proposed solution operates with the data collected in a real-time, 
or near real-time manner, then the phase of the mission is acknowledged as operational, otherwise 
planning.  The method of the study is classified as no validation if it does not give any form of 
validation. Otherwise, it is labeled as a simulation, case study or deployment to a test/live 
environment.  
 
2.3 Results of Analysis 
2.3.1 General Results from the Analysis 
45% of the studies occur in the military, 45% in the cyber-physical systems and 9% in the 
enterprise domain. Main cyber action in 41% is event, 32% threat, and 27% incident. All the papers 
consider the impact on mission capability to some extent. Only 27% also deal with the economic 
impact. At the asset layer, availability is the most prevalent impact type at a rate of 82%. The ratios 
of studies that consider integrity and confidentiality are 68% and 59% respectively. Three studies 
do not provide precise information about these impact types at all, and one study deals with only 
integrity attacks. All of the remaining ones address the availability, which shows the most common 
focus of impact assessment studies. The general overview of the findings are given in Table 3. 
2.3.2 Method of Study 
50% of the studies employ manual methods that depend on the elicitation of expert 
knowledge for the identification of dependencies and cyber actions. In the remaining studies, 
which use partially automated means, the detection of cyber action relies on automatized systems. 
Extraction of the dependencies, however, is left to manual methods. Thus, practical deployment 
of such frameworks is not feasible in medium- or large-sized organizations. All studies deal with 




missions that belong to only one organization. Though frameworks of most studies handle more 
than one mission, they do not thoroughly examine the feasibility of the proposed methods in 
settings having various missions, and Edell (2015) uses a reference architecture with a functional 
layer that connects asset and business process layers. Garvey and Patel (2014) utilize mission trees, 
which include the mission elements and main mission functions. Wu, Kang, and Li (2015) describe 
the impact on assets with some types of damages that are not systematically derived from business 
processes.  Thus, they lack a mission layer but have a service layer. Cam and Mouallem (2013) 
employ an ordered binary decision diagram for the availability evaluation of services given by the 
status of assets. Terminal nodes represent the level of mission assurance. Kanoun, Papillon and 
Dubus (2015) map the terminal node of each attack path to a detrimental event that includes the 
definition of a security violation in an IT service. As it does not provide a further link with the 
business process, it is concluded that this study has a service layer but not a business process layer.    
2.3.3 Method of Validation 
The most frequently preferred validation method is case study, which is 41% although the 
degree of rigorousness varies significantly. 27% employ simulation whereas 23% demonstrated 
their contribution at test or live environments and 9% do not provide any validation. 27% of the 
studies can be applied in operational settings as they obtain real- or near real-time event data. The 
remaining ones contribute to the planning phase due to the more static nature of the data sources. 
In this analysis, besides the system monitoring data, vulnerabilities identified during the 
vulnerability management processes are also categorized as an event. However, as vulnerability 
identification tasks do not generate continuous real or near real-time data, the mission phase of a 
study is classified as planning if it only handles vulnerabilities. 












2.3.4 Representation of Layers in Impact Assessment 
There are three layers in an enterprise to assess the impact of cyber actions. These layers 
are asset layer, service layer and mission layer (Jakobson, 2011; Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016) 
Mission (a.k.a. Business Process)Layer:  91% of the studies establish a mission layer to 
represent the ongoing mission or business process.  A task that may have dependency with other 
tasks constitutes the unit in this layer. A control-flow idea provides the ordering of tasks, which 
also forms the primary building block of horizontal dependencies. Choobineh, Anderson and 
Grimaila (2012), Creese et al. (2013), Musman and Temin (2015), Angelini and Santucci (2015), 
and Noel at al. (2015) use Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) which has constructs for 
the representation of these dependencies. Granadillo et al. (2016) utilize a probabilistic graphical 
model, which defines business function nodes and maps them to the business process nodes. 
However, this model does not reflect the timing and workflow requirements. Shaw (2003) models 
the workflow of the mission layer as a discrete event system. Some studies that contribute to the 
cyber-physical domain evaluate the impact of the cyber action using reliability models which also 
include the representation of physical components (Lemay, Fernandez and Knight 2014; Xiang, 
Wang and Zhang 2014; Giani et al. 2012; Lange, Krotofil and Möller 2015). As business processes 
are incorporated into the models, these studies are considered to have a mission layer. 
Service Layer: 41% of the studies have a service layer in their frameworks. Lei (2015) and 
Heinbockel, Kertzner, and McQuaid (2010) explicitly define such a layer that establishes links 
between asset and mission layers. Other studies illustrate a business/mission function layer that 
maps assets to function-based categories then to missions. LaVallee, Fix, and Edell (2015) use a 
reference architecture that has a functional layer that connects asset and business process layers. 
Garvey and Patel (2014) utilize mission trees, which include the mission elements and main 




mission functions. Wu, Kang, and Li (2015) describe the impact on assets with some types of 
damages, which are not systematically derived from business processes.  Thus, it lacks a mission 
layer but has a service layer. Cam and Mouallem (2013) employ an ordered binary decision 
diagram for the availability evaluation of services given by the status of assets. Terminal nodes 
represent the level of mission assurance. Kanoun, Papillon and Dubus (2015) map the terminal 
node of each attack path to a detrimental event that includes the definition of a security violation 
in an IT service. As it does not provide a further link with the business process, this study has a 
service layer but not a business process layer.    
Asset Layer: All studies except one included an asset layer. Most of the studies utilize 
network topology as the representation method for this layer whereas some studies employ models 
such as attack graphs, which also include the topology information in their formalism (Jajodia et 
al. 2011; Wu, Kang and Li 2015; Kanoun, Papillon and Dubus 2015; Llansó and Klatt 2014; Noel 
et al. 2015). Although network connections given in the topology represent the horizontal 
dependencies, it is important to note that they may help to understand the propagation of the attack 
but not the impact. Even the attack graph modeling, which is interested in finding the dependencies 
between vulnerabilities of hosts to identify the attack paths, does not provide an instrument for 
assessing the impact propagation. In a typical attack scenario, perpetuators infiltrate into the target 
system, do lateral movements, reach the main target system asset or data and commit the final 
action such as exfiltration, deletion or modification of the data. The existing horizontal 
dependencies in the analyzed studies enable us to track and evaluate the possible movements of an 
attacker until the final act. However, they do not include any data and functional dependency 
representations, which are required for the impact assessment of the final action and its 
consequences on other parts of the system. Therefore, they may contribute to the assessment of 




the threat but not the impact. Studies in the cyber-physical domain use network topologies that 
also show the functional dependencies between cyber and physical components that enable the 
tracing of impact propagation from cyber to physical space (Xiang, Wang and Zhang 2014). Cam 
and Mouallem (2013) determine the security status of assets by using Time Petri Net models. Shaw 
(2003) and Choobineh, Anderson and Grimaila (2012) simply handle this layer by a list of cyber-
assets. Jakobson (2011) and Lei (2015) utilize graph-based notations.  
2.3.5 Representation of Dependencies Impact Propagation 
While assessing the impact of cyber actions two types of dependencies could be 
considered. Vertical view refers to the dependencies between resources of different layers, while 
the horizontal view refers to the dependencies between resources at the same layer (Shemali-Sendi 
et al., 2016) (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. Horizontal and Vertical Dependency of Layers (Shemali-Sendi et al., 2016) 
 




Vertical Dependencies: 77% of the studies define or assume vertical dependencies 
between assets and mission/service layers. These dependencies establish the socio-technical 
property by demonstrating the interactions between technology and business processes. The edges 
between different layers represent vertical dependencies in the dependency graph notation 
provided in (Jakobson 2011). Musman and Temin (2015) introduce the relevant data- or system 
assets as resources of tasks defined at the mission layer.  Llansó and Klatt (2014) link mission- 
and service layers via data assets. Granadillo et al. (2016) connect different layers with the edges 
of a probabilistic graph. Choobineh, Anderson and Grimaila (2012) use a matrix that maps assets 
to mission tasks. Garvey and Patel (2014) provide the link between mission and service layers by 
the edges of the mission tree. As the reliability model that represents the physical components acts 
as a mission layer in some studies of the cyber-physical domain, the association of physical 
components to a cyber asset forms a vertical dependency (Lemay, Fernandez and Knight 2014; 
Xiang, Wang and Zhang 2014).  
Horizontal Dependencies: Jakobson (2011), Lei (2015), Granadillo et al. (2016), and 
Llansó and Klatt (2014) utilize a structure that covers all layers, mission, service, asset and all 
types of dependencies, horizontal and vertical. Jakobson (2011), who also establishes the reference 
framework in this analysis, employs an impact dependency graph as the main representation of 
layers and their dependencies. It proposes a method for the analysis of the impacts that propagate 
over this graph structure.  The main contribution of Lei (2015) is not about impact assessment as 
it utilizes the framework of Jakobson (2011), but it proposes a cyber situational awareness system, 
which interacts with mission situational management in the physical space to make the 
continuation of a mission possible in case of a successful cyber attack. Granadillo et al. (2016) 
provide an impact propagation framework based on a probabilistic graph model for evaluating the 




operational and financial consequences of cyber-threats. The study considers that business 
processes depend on business functions and these functions rely on IT resources.  It is assumed 
that business processes represent the mission layer, business functions correspond to the service 
layer and IT resources form the asset layer. Horizontal and vertical dependencies are established 
based on probabilistic models. Llansó and Klatt (2014) estimate the level of attacker efforts and 
mission impacts. The noteworthy contribution of this study is that it quantifies the impact on a 
mission by the mission- and system-based effectiveness metrics deduced from the sensor data.  
2.3.6 Economics of Cybersecurity Risk and Impact 
Quantifying impact of cyber actions in monetary values would help make better decisions 
while choosing a risk mitigation strategy. There are three focus areas of the papers, which include 
economic aspects of cyber risk and impact: reliability (Sheldon, Abercrombie and Mili, 2008; 
Abercrombie, Sheldon, and Mili 2009; Lemay, Fernandez and Knight, 2014), resiliency (Giani, et. 
al. 2012), and return of investment (Granadillo, et. al. 2016; Garvey and Patel, 2014).  
Abercrombie, Sheldon and Grimaila (2010), Wu, Kang and Li (2015), Granadillo et al. 
(2016), and Garvey and Patel (2014) cover all types of impacts on missions and cyber assets. 
Abercrombie, Sheldon and Mili (2008) measure the impact of threats on security requirements 
according to the views of each stakeholder. It evaluates the violation of security requirements with 
the term, mean failure cost, which is the quantification of the productivity, business, or data losses 
regarding the financial basis. Abercrombie, Sheldon and Grimaila (2010) discuss the utilization of 
the same impact measurement idea to a mission-centric analysis rather than a security requirement-
centric one. However, it does not provide an example or use case analysis that explores the 
feasibility of the idea. Wu, Kang, and Li (2015) determine the value of assets according to the 
economic loss, environmental damage, casualties and repair cost incurred in case of being 




attacked. This study does not conclude the descriptions of loss by the analysis of mission flows. 
Granadillo et al. (2016) evaluate the operational and financial consequences of mitigations to 
cyber-threats. The financial impact of an attack is determined according to the annual loss 
expectancy that covers the loss of asset, data, reputation, revenue or customers. The limitation of 
this study is that it employs the impact propagation constructs for the evaluation of the mitigation 
actions, not cyber action itself. Garvey and Patel (2014) use utility theory for measuring the 
performance of organizations and effectiveness of missions. This study determines the economic 
benefit returns of cybersecurity investments. However, they do not represent the asset layer in their 
impact propagation framework. In all these studies, the impacts of cyber actions that cause 
confidentiality, integrity or availability results are covered at the asset layer. As a different 
approach, Musman and Temin (2015) classify the impact types into six categories, interruption, 
degradation, interception, modification, fabrication and unauthorized use. 
2.3.7 Knowledge Gap 
The analyzed papers do not consider the cross-organizational nature of most enterprise and 
military operations. In enterprise operations, collaborations are experienced in the form of 
outsourcing while as contractors in military missions. Since assets are shared across all parties 
involved in a mission (R. Matulevičius et al. 2016), security requirements and controls must be 
applied on information systems that support the assets across all collaborating parties. Parties 
involved in the mission have separate goals depending on the role they respectively play. 
Differences in goals may cause variations in the perception of impacts that may lead to different 
security requirements and countermeasures. Further investigation of goal-based modeling methods 
in representing the function-based relationship between collaborating parties should be done. 
These methods model the processes according to the overall goal of the mission (Sterling and 




Taveter 2009). The overall goal is further broken down into functional goals. Tasks required to 
achieve each functional goal of the mission are assigned to a role and are carried out by a specific 
party collaborating in the mission.  
Almost all analyzed studies have a layer that represents the information-system assets. The 
typical approach employed in this layer is network- and asset-centric rather than data-centric as 
the system assets are mapped to the nodes of the service- or mission layers without the 
consideration of data assets and the identification of relevant data flows. The drawback of this 
approach is twofold: First, the horizontal dependencies cannot be precisely identified, and impact 
analysis starts with the incomplete asset set. For instance, a datum can reside in many nodes or be 
temporarily stored in the network-forwarding nodes, meaning that a confidentiality threat to each 
of these nodes may have an impact on the mission. Only the tracing of the data flows can reveal 
the complete set of assets that may cause information leakage. Second, the approach may lead to 
putting system administrators, not the information asset owners, into the center for the extraction 
of expert knowledge, although they are the least familiar with business processes. The asset-centric 
approaches are not enough to cover the risk landscape induced by recent technologies such as 
cloud computing, mobility, and the Internet of Things (NSS Labs 2013), and the focus of threat 
modeling has shifted to data-centric approaches (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
2016). The ICT process model proposed by Musman and Temin (2015) is an example of a data-
flow representation. The integration of data-flow models into the asset layer and establishing 
vertical dependencies with the other layers over data rather than system assets may improve impact 
assessment capability.  
The horizontal dependency in the asset layer is an important construct to analyze the 
propagation of the impact caused by a cyber action on an asset to other assets. However, in the 




studies, these dependencies are only established for the identification of attack paths. Cyber action 
finally affects an asset at the end of the path, and then the impact propagates only to the service- 
or mission layer without considering the further spreading in the same layer. It is essential to 
identify the data and functional dependencies between different assets to understand the 
propagation of the impact to the other parts that do not belong to the attack path.   
The development of automatic- or semi-automatic methods for the identification of 
dependencies is a significant issue that requires more interest from the research community. For 
the extraction of all types of dependencies, the analyzed studies rely on manual methods or do not 
detail the extraction techniques. Business process mining, extracting process knowledge from the 
event logs, is utilized as an important approach for the automatic identification of business-process 
flows in the literature (Van Der Aalst 2012). These methods can find the horizontal dependencies 
at the mission layer.  Automatic methods have been applied to network traffic or host- based data 
actively or passively for the discovery of dependencies among network services (Chen et al. 2008; 
Natarajan et al. 2012; Lucian et al. 2009; Zand et al. 2014). These methods can determine the 
horizontal dependencies at asset and service layers.  
The identification of vertical dependencies is an open research area. As event logs may 
have information about business processes and system activities, the adaptation of business process 
mining techniques is required for the identification of dependencies between the mission and 
service layers. The discovery methods applied for network services may explore the mappings 
between asset or service layers. 
The dependency data obtained by expert knowledge elicitation may suffer problems 
regarding data accuracy as the experts may not know all the details of business processes or 
information systems. On the other side, some researchers question the relevance of findings 




identified by automatic dependency discovery methods whereas it is also shown that these methods 
determine the dependencies experts do not know (Kott, Ludwig, and Lange 2017). Thus, instead 
of perceiving the expert knowledge elicitation and automatic extraction methods are complete 
alternatives to each other, both methods should be utilized for having more accurate dependency 
data.  
The analyzed studies calculate the economic impact based on the cost of loss of production 
and quality. Granadillo et al. (2016) mention the loss of reputation, legal procedures, loss of 
revenue from clients or customers, and insurance costs. Likewise, Abercrombie, Sheldon and 
Grimaila (2010) mention a loss of reputation and liability costs. However, none of the papers 
develops a method to calculate loss of reputation or liability costs. First, new models that include 
these losses should be developed to show if they have an impact on the business process or 
missions. Second, studies ignore the ripple effect caused by a cyber action while gauging the 
economic value of impact. Ripple effect can be calculated by considering the horizontal and 
vertical dependencies within and between the layers. Third, assigning a realistic monetary value 
to the impact of a cyber action is a challenge. Calculating the financial value of a business process 
rather than an asset or a service may give a more realistic and holistic result since it is easier to 
determine the strategic value of the business process in an enterprise setting. Fourth, the advanced 
persistent threat in which the primary motivation is the exfiltration of critical data rather than 
disrupting the ongoing missions is a significant problem. Although early detection of these threats 
remains a technical challenge, the incurred economic loss should be quantified to make better 
decisions during risk management or incident handling. The economic impact of all forms of 
confidentiality threats should be better addressed in future studies. 
  







The characteristics of the research problem affect the methodology to be used. The research 
problem is quantifying the impact of cyber actions on missions or business processes. The problem 
involves advanced technologies, attack methods, complex engineering and business systems, 
interdependencies within and among the layers of an enterprise, propagation of impact and related 
uncertainties. The first implication is scarcity of data (Martin Eling & Werner Schnell, 2016). In 
order to cope with this problem, relying on the work of other researchers who have accessed the 
data and extending adoption of the theories, approaches, and conclusions of their works are 
essential.  
The second implication of the research problem is the impracticality of experimenting in a 
real operational environment. It is not achievable to empirically test any hypothesis to make 
inferences and validate the conclusions in a timely and cost effective manner. To provide a solution 
to the infeasibility of using a real operational environment, modeling and simulation can be used 
as an effective tool. If real world experimentation is not attainable or not efficient, simulation 
models of the real system or the proposed system can be employed for experimentation purposes 
(Law, 2008). Modeling and simulation is an effective decision support tool for both technical and 
managerial problems (Tolk, 2013). Theories which can be totally new or based on previous 
theories, can be represented as models and implemented as simulations (Diallo, Padilla, Bozkurt, 
& Tolk, 2013). 
Credibility of the modeling and simulation method relies on validation. Validation is “the 
process of determining whether a simulation model is an accurate representation of the system, for 




the particular objectives of the study” (Law, 2008). A method of validation is applying solutions 
to a real system and comparing it with the results of the simulation. However, this is not always 
possible. There are several factors that make validation of findings of a simulation difficult or even 
impossible. One of these factors is unavailability or inexistence of the real world system or relevant 
data regarding the system (Law, 2008). Since modeling and simulation is mostly used for problems 
with few or no empirical data and even though a complete validation is not possible, there are 
several techniques to validate the system behavior and define how realistic the model is (Tolk, 
2013). Tolk (2013) states, “if all parts and their relations and functional transactions are reasonable 
– which translates to their following an accepted theory that can be used to describe the problem 
– we assume the model to be reasonable as well”. 
An important point that should be recognized for the validation of modeling and simulation 
based research is to consider that a model developed for a particular objective may not be valid for 
a different objective. During the research design, validation of a simulation model should be 
utilized in an iterative and continuous manner up to reaching the final model (Landry, Malouin, & 
Oral, 1983; Robinson, 2013; Sargent, 2015). 
Based on the characteristics of the research problem. Modeling and simulation is used as 
the main research method. The details of the methodology are given in Figure 4.  





Figure 4. Research methodology 
 
The method of the proposed research is explained below. 
1. Review literature to find out valuable approaches and theories which are 
appropriate for the research problem 
2. Model Development 
a. Conceptual Model Development: A conceptual model will be developed 
based on the theories and approaches being examined. Functional 
Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) (Garvey & Pinto, 2009) is the main 
method, which will be modified to assess the ripple effects. A new approach 
will also be developed for economic cost estimation. 
b. Develop Computer Model: A computer model will be developed to 
formalize the conceptual model. A computer model will be improved 




thorough iterations to better represent the real world problem to a 
satisfactory level until reaching an acceptable level. 
3. Model Validation: The developed model will be validated through sensitivity 
analysis. A synthetic network of assets, services and business processes including 
several types of nodes will be generated in computing environment. The synthetic 
model will include all types of possible complexities a network may have. The 
complexities can be interdependencies between nodes within and among layers, 
different cyber event and incident types, and dependence on time, etc. The model 
specification and the results of the simulation are validated by sensitivity analysis. 
Otherwise, the steps in the model development stage will be repeated until a valid 
model is reached. 
4. Reporting: Research findings will be reported. 
The model will employ Functional Dependency Network Analysis and methods to calculate 
economic impact of cyber actions on missions, which are briefly explained in the following 
sections. 
 
3.2 Expected Results and Criteria for Evaluating Results 
The expected results of the developed model are listed in the objectives of the research. 
These results are listed below. 
• A quantitative model to determine the impact propagation within a layer.  
• A quantitative model to determine the impact propagation between different layers 
within an enterprise.  
• An approach to estimate the economic cost of a cyber incident or event. 




3.2.1 Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) 
3.2.1.1. Overview of FDNA 
Functional Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) is a method “developed to model and 
measure dependency relationships between suppliers of technologies and providers of services 
these technologies enable the enterprise to deliver” (Garvey & Pinto, 2009).  
Modeling the dependency relations between nodes of a system is important to model and 
measure the ripple effects of failure or loss of operability of one of the nodes over the other nodes 
on which it is dependent.  
The FDNA employs graph theory to define the dependencies between its nodes (Figure 5).  
FDNA can be a used to model the dependencies of a variety of systems, such as “the 
domains of input-output economics, critical infrastructure risk analysis, and non-stationary, 
temporal, dependency analysis problems” (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5. A Sample 4-Node FDNA Graph Topology 
The major concepts of FDNA are defined below. 




Operational Performance: A measure which is used for stating the realization of a node’s 
output (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Operability: “A state where a node is functioning at some level of performance” (Garvey 
& Pinto, 2009). 
Operability Level: “The level of performance achieved by a node” or “the utility it yields” 
(Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Baseline Operability Level (BOL): “The operability level of the receiver node when the 
feeder is completely inoperable” (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Feeder Node: A node which contributes to the operability of one or more other nodes (i.e. 
receiver nodes) (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Receiver Node: A node which receives contribution from one or more other nodes (i.e. 
feeder nodes) to have some level of operability (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Strength of Dependency (SOD): “The strength with which a receiver node’s operability 
level relies on the operability level of feeder nodes. SOD captures the effects of relationships that 
increase the performance as addition to BOL” (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
Criticality of Dependency (COD): “The criticality of feeder node contributions to a 
receiver node for it to achieve its operability level objectives. COD governs how the performance 
of the receiver node will decrease below the BOL in time and possible become inoperable 
eventually” (Garvey & Pinto, 2009). 
The general equation of FDNA algebra for the graph in Figure 6 is given below. 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓�𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�, 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 , 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
where, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 is operability level of the receiver node, 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is operability level of the feeder node,  




𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is Strength of Dependency (SOD) constraint and (0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1), 
𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗is Criticality of Dependency (COD) constraint and (0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100) 
 
Figure 6. A 2-Node FDNA Graph 
 
FDNA is very instrumental to model the ripple effects of any loss of operability in feeder 
node(s) to analyze not just operability but also business continuity of an enterprise. As depicted in 
Figure 7, capability portfolio of an enterprise including internal and external portfolio dependency 
node(s), and capabilities can be represented by FDNA to calculate the loss of enterprise capability 
in case of a loss of functionality of any node.  
 





Figure 7. Capability Portfolio Context Representation of FDNA Graph 
3.2.1.2. Previous Studies on FDNA 
FDNA is used in its first traditional form or after modified for particular settings for various 
aims. In this section, relevant previous studies are analyzed. 
The purpose of a study by Drabble (2011) is to understand the effects of decisions made in 
one system on dependent systems and make the collaboration meaningful without much effort. 
The approach presented in the study helps determine the information dependency among the 
systems. The information mentioned in this study includes people, locations, resources, and 
concepts from different origins. This helps decision makers within interdependent systems to 
perceive the possible constraints and restraints that others’ decisions provide and also will help 
determine how compatible their decisions are with the other systems.  
The authors propose an ontology based information management capability (OBIMC) to 
help information sharing collaboration that is not dependent on any constituent system or any user 




within these systems. This approach is intended to solve information collaboration issues among 
systems that don't have an agreed purpose. 
On the other hand, this approach differs from FDNA, which focuses on calculating the risk 
among interdependent systems. OBIMC focuses on the dependencies to provide better link 
semantics, providing redundancy by alternative feeder and receiver nodes. Another feature of this 
technique is to provide reasoning over groups of feeder and receiver nodes by making sub-
networks. The study shows the process of how OBIMC works with an example in a healthcare 
network. 
Another study by Drabble (2012) aims to solve the collaboration issue within 
interdependent networks where there is a need to understand which information is essential to be 
communicated and how to pass this information within the network. The study describes a 
dependency based network model that makes both qualitative and quantitative information flow 
channel through the interdependent network of people, organizations, locations, resources, and 
concepts. This model is required for the emergency response networks where there is a lack of 
information, and anything can be crucial for understanding the situation.  
The approach presented in this study analyzes the network and provides Plan Models that 
outline the required adjustments within the nodes to deliver the intended outcome from the 
network. The Plan Models indicate the required changes for the nodes directly, or indirectly 
through the nodes on which they have a dependency. 
The method presented in this study, Athena, analyzes the capabilities, dependencies, and 
vulnerabilities of the nodes to predict the potential impact of the changes in one node at the others. 
This study has similarities with FDNA but doesn't focus on calculating the risk of interdependent 




systems and the risk mitigation strategies for them. However, it uses some of the terms as same as 
FDNA, such as SOD, COD, BOLP, MOE, and MOP. 
The study applies the model in a counter insurgency example to show the advantages of it. 
The aim of this study (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013a) is to assess dependencies in the 
System of Systems (SoS). Their objectives are assessing the operability, reliability, and resilience 
of SoS architectures, specifically in two kinds of networks: operational and development. This 
study adapts the FDNA in order to assess the operability of the operational system based on the 
strength and criticality of the functional dependencies among the constituent systems and 
capabilities of SoS. Additionally, this study presents Development Dependency Network Analysis 
in order to assess how a network of constituent systems and delays within the network affect the 
capabilities and the time required for development.  
One novelty of the study is adding a term to FDNA, degraded functioning, meaning that a 
component of the system may operate with a degraded level due to its malfunctions that may affect 
the other nodes of the network. 
Additionally, this study presents a test of stochastic analysis with FDNA. The authors 
conducted an analysis for the operability of the constituent systems of SoS. The analysis includes 
a probability distribution for the operability of such systems.  
The last contribution of the study is the Development Dependency Network Analysis 
(DDNA). The purpose of this technique is to evaluate how network topology and delays affect the 
development time and capabilities of the SoS. This technique uses the FDNA concepts and 
represents them as done in Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT) and Critical Path 
Method (CPM).   




Guariniello & DeLaurentis (2013b) studied the effects of dependencies within systems of 
systems in the space operations and development research activities. They applied the previously 
modified FDNA and DDNA approaches in their previous study (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 
2013a) into the space systems operations and development.  
From the methodological perspective, this study does not add more to FDNA than the 
previous one. Similarly, it employs FDNA to calculate the dependencies within an operational 
system of systems by adding the malfunction term. For example, it helps to analyze how the Mars 
mission equipment depends on the orbital communication satellites. For DDNA, it borrows SOD 
and COD from FDNA and builds a new technique also borrowing concepts from PERT and CPM 
methods. DDNA is used to analyze developmental dependencies. It helps to plan parallel 
development of space systems to shorten time to conduct enough research and prototypes for each 
technology new space systems requires. The study applies these two techniques on hypothetical 
space missions. The results provide important outcomes that show the dependency analysis in both 
operation and development. The results show the scalability of the methods and their power to 
analyze the dependencies within the space infrastructure. 
Guariniello & DeLaurentis (2013c) applied the same modified FDNA approach to a new 
field, servicing for on-orbit satellites. The modified and stochastic FDNA methodology is 
borrowed from the authors’ previous study (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013a). In this study, they 
model the satellites as a two-level system of systems. The lower level considers the modular 
satellite systems and analyzes the functional dependencies among the systems within a satellite, 
such as power supply, communication, navigation, and computing. At the higher level, they 
analyze the functional interdependencies among different types of satellites, such as 
communication, observation, experimental, and servicing satellites. They also take the satellite 




groups at different orbit levels into consideration. The authors apply the approach to a hypothetical 
case of satellites and discuss the importance of the analysis of dependencies and how to improve 
the susceptibility of the satellites. The results compare the satellite life lengths with or without the 
operation of servicing satellites. They also provide insights into the applicability of the method on 
similar problems within and outside of space infrastructure field.    
The objective of the article by Guariniello and DeLaurentis (2014a) is quantifying the 
impact of cyber attacks targeting communications and information flows on the operability of the 
component systems. The authors also “aim to evaluate and compare different architectures with 
respect to their reliability and robustness under attack” (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2014a). The 
whole impact is much more than the impact on a single attacked component of communication 
and information systems. For a holistic impact assessment, ripple effects on the behavior of whole 
system-of-systems caused by interdependencies should be considered. In the original FDNA, SOD 
and COD values can be identified through expert judgment and evaluation or may come from the 
result of simulations and experiments. The analysis can be a deterministic evaluation of a single 
instance of the SoS (i.e., internal health status or Self-Effectiveness), or a stochastic quantification 
of the overall SoS behavior. The authors apply the modified FDNA methodology they developed 
(Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013a) and applied to other fields (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013b; 
2013c) in their previous studies. Guariniello and DeLaurentis propose a modification to Functional 
Dependency Network Analysis (FDNA) tool to analyze operability of the communication 
architectures when they are exposed to cyber-attacks, from a system of systems view. In the 
modified version of FDNA, internal (primary and secondary) and external (tertiary) effects are 
taken into account because of the nature of the impact of cyber attacks. Internal effects are already 
modeled by Self-Effectiveness. Guariniello and DeLaurentis add weight on each dependency link, 




called Availability of Data (AOD), to model the effect of specific communication and data loss on 
a single interdependency as well as to represent partially compromised communication and data. 
The results also show that the architecture of the systems can be modified to improve its resilience 
to cyber attacks.  
The purpose of this study by Guariniello and DeLaurentis (2014b) is to assess the effects 
of interdependencies among a system of systems on the metrics that show the properties of SoS, 
which are known as ilities. The authors apply the modified FDNA methodology they developed 
(Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2013a) in their previous study. They provide a hypothetical case to 
apply and discuss the validity of their approach. They applied the methods to a marine combat SoS 
that includes ships, helicopters, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Unmanned Surface Vehicles, mines, 
and submarines. The results show that a trade-off among ilities exists. The decision makers can 
adjust the resilience, reliability, and flexibility of the SoS according to the mission’s requirements, 
resources, and objectives. The results are preliminary and need to be improved by further studies, 
especially cost analysis.  
The purpose of the study by Wang, Zhang, and Li (2014) is to analyze the security of 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). The authors employ FDNA to solve this issue by 
calculating the impact of threats to the service performance. The results imply that the FDNA 
provides stable results and it is convergent. The increasing amount of iterations starts to does not 
change the results significantly after a number of iteration achieved. According to the results, the 
success rate of the current GNSS is almost 5%, which means that it is highly probable that it will 
fail against the threats. Based on the authors’ results, FDNA is an appropriate and beneficial tool 
to fulfill the purpose of the study.  




The purpose of this study (Cole, 2017) is to evaluate the impacts of messy data in System 
of Systems (SoS). In other words, how does data quality in one constituent system affect the 
dependent systems within a SoS? The authors present and implement a new quantitative approach 
called Data Dependency Network Analysis (DDNA) to assess the effects of data in SoS and 
provide mitigation strategies. DDNA adapts the Functional Dependency Network Analysis 
(FDNA) by adding new parameters including Output Data Quality Level, Incoming Data 
Cleansing Effectiveness, Data Governance Effectiveness, Operability Strength, Strength of Data 
Dependency, and Contextual Alignment Factor. The authors present an Agent-Based Model using 
NetLogo. During each iteration of the simulation, receiver nodes’ states are updated based on the 
state of data providers, node’s parameters and system self effectiveness parameters. DDNA can be 
used for three purposes:  
Identification of Bad Actors: Identifying the nodes affecting the SoS negatively. 
Improvement of Data Cleansing: Identifying the data degradation mitigation strategies. 
Improvement of Data Governance: Finding the optimum strategy to minimize data 
degradation. 
Servi and Garvey (2017) aim to develop new methods based on FDNA to answer the 
following questions to achieve resiliency of the enterprise system. 
“What is the effect on the ability of an enterprise to operate if one or more elements or 
element dependency chains degrade, fail, or are eliminated due to exploited vulnerabilities?  
How much operational degradation occurs, where does it ripple across its elements, and 
does it breach minimum levels of performance?  
Which nodes or elements are most critical to achieving performance objectives?” (Servi 
& Garvey, 2017). 




The purpose of the study by Short, Lai, and Bossuyt (2018) is to model how to disable non-
critical subcomponents of a system when the system fails in order to avoid the failure of the critical 
subcomponents. The authors propose a methodology, failure flow decision function (FFDF) 
methodology, to achieve this. It helps to model the failure flow so that it would be possible to 
direct the failure to the non-critical subsystems instead of critical ones. The paper provides a case 
study of the proposed FFDF methodology on a Mars exploration platform.  
The importance of this methodology increases when the system at hand is not in a 
serviceable location or situation due to certain reasons, such as high cost and lack of resources. 
The methodology helps decision makers best before the architectural design of the system to be 
produced. 
FFDF has differences from FDNA. FDNA is a unidirectional functional dependency 
analysis method that depends on the input-output relationship. SODA (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 
2017) is a tool that is a modified version of FDNA for stochastic operational functional dependency 
analysis. FFDF, unlike FDNA and SODA, can analyze backward failure flow since it is not 
unidirectional. However, a disadvantage of FFDF is that its analyses are based on binary failure, 
meaning that there is no degraded operational state for the nodes while FDNA and SODA have 
this option. On the other hand, the lack of this option is not an issue of FFDF according to the 
authors, since it is not intended to analyze systems that are repairable due to their location or 
situation. 
According to the results of the case study in this article, FFDF is beneficial and helps 
improve the survival of the test equipment by directing the failure to a non-critical subcomponent 
instead of a critical one. FFDF helps system designers during the conceptual phase of design. 




Garvey discussed how FDNA could be used to answer questions similar to the ones below 
(Garvey, 2018). 
“What is the effect on the ability of a system of system to operate effectively if one or more 
entities or feeder-receiver chains degrade, fail, or are eliminated due to adverse events or 
situations?  
How much operational degradation occurs, and does it breach the system of system’s 
minimum acceptable level of performance?” (Garvey, 2018). 
In the FDNA context, resilience is defined as “the ability of a system to absorb the effects 
of nodal degradation while maintaining an acceptable level of operational effectiveness” (Garvey, 
2018). The article asserts that FDNA is a useful tool to model and measure the resilience of a 
system being engineered to interoperate with other interacting systems and elements (Garvey, 
2018). Garvey offers to use FDNA for a resilient system design or measuring the resilience of a 
system to system failures or exploitations. Measurement of resilience enables decision makers and 
planners to determine optimal investment levels to maintain a system of systems operational 
effectiveness. 
Pinto, Garvey, and Santos proposed research to apply FDNA on the cyber layer of an 
enterprise to address resiliency of the system (Pinto, Garvey, & Santos, n.d.). The cyber layer of 
an enterprise system is getting more important since most of the functions rely on the cyber layer. 
Both malicious and non-malicious failures of the cyber layer cause a failure to deliver those 
functionalities. Pinto, Garvey, and Santos list the following steps to apply FDNA to the cyber layer 
of any enterprise system. 
“Develop a functional dependency model of an enterprise of concern 
Identify the functions that are delivered by/through the cyber subsystem 




Highlight these functions as the cyber layer of the enterprise 
Perform FDNA on this cyber layer, particularly highlighting the resilience (and its proxy 
measures) 
Applying FDNA in the cyber layer of an enterprise system is valuable since system 
engineers, managers, and administrators may be able to answer the following questions. 
What functions does the cyber layer provide, whether by design or by emergence? 
How to decompose a cyber layer into functional performance objectives? 
How to establish measures of performance (MOP) for these functional objectives? 
How to translate various and disparate MOP’s unto comparable and algebraically 
manageable measures of effectiveness (MOE). 
How to describe robustness and rapidity of the cyber layer and each of its subcomponents? 
How to establish recovery objectives for the cyber layer and each of its subcomponents? 
How to describe resilience of the cyber layer and each of its sub-components?” 
Garrido-Pelaz, González-Manzano, and Pastrana (2016) aim to develop a model for 
cybersecurity information sharing among dependent organizations being impacted by different 
cyber attacks (Garrido-Pelaz, González-Manzano, & Pastrana, 2016). The model has two stages: 
propagation of cyber-attacks and information sharing. The authors used FDNA to simulate 
propagation of cyber-attacks and game theory to make decisions on information sharing. The 
developed model uses several variables to decide on cyber attack information sharing.  
Costa, McShane, and Pinto (2015) aim to apply FDNA on interbank lending to build a 
model to answer the following questions. 
“What causes a problem in one sector of the economy to spread through the rest of it?  
What are the channels for financial contagion?  




Suppose a bank becomes insolvent and fails. What is the effect on other banks in the 
system?  
How can we measure the spread of risk in a system as interconnected as the banking 
sector?” Costa, McShane, and Pinto (2015) 
Costa, McShane, and Pinto first make a literature review to find out the methods to study 
financial contagion (Costa, McShane, & Pinto, 2015). The authors employ a system-of-systems 
approach and a method of network analysis. FDNA is modified to simulate the impact of the 
collapse of a bank on other financial institutions. In the developed model, the FDNA concepts of 
baseline operability level and strength of dependency apply themselves well to a financial 
contagion model. However, there is difficulty in applying the concept of criticality of dependency 
on this model. This particular aspect of FDNA does not describe this interbank lending system 
well (Costa et al., 2015). 
The goal of Guariniello and DeLaurentis is to develop a framework to support decision in 
systems design and architecture. The article introduces the system operational dependency analysis 
(SODA) methodology. SODA is a useful tool to support design decision making (Guariniello & 
DeLaurentis, 2017). Guariniello & DeLaurentis (2017) propose a parametric model of the behavior 
of the system. SODA method can be used for various aims. SODA supports: 
SODA is based on Leontief-based Input/Output method originally proposed by Haimes, 
and the FDNA method. One of its innovations is adding Impact of Dependency (IOD) as a third 
parameter alongside SOD and COD. IOD "ranges between 1 and 100 and is defined as 100 divided 
by the slope of the COD dependent" (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2017). IOD enables SODA to 
model dependencies better than FDNA, particularly the dependencies that exhibit an input/output 
behavior similar to a step function (Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2017). The authors also provide 




approaches to use SODA in a deterministic or a probabilistic manner. They modify FDNA to 
support a resilient system design or measure the resilience of a system to system failures or 
exploitations. Measurement of resilience enables decision makers and planners to determine 
optimal investment levels to maintain a system of systems operational effectiveness. 
In their study, DeLaurentis et al.(2012) compares existing system of systems analysis 
methods. They modified FDNA to analyze the SoS deterministically and stochastically. They 
added a self-effectiveness term for each node as different from the original FDNA that gives self-
effectiveness (operability/measure of effectiveness) values only to the feeder nodes. This value 
indicates the nodes’ own performance regardless of any dependency on the other nodes.  
They analyze a sample five-node SoS network deterministically. Firstly, they give reduced 
self-effectiveness values to each node while keeping the rest of the nodes’ self-effectiveness at 100 
and analyze the operability values of the other nodes. Then they give the reduced values to pairs 
of nodes and further investigate the effects. They also conducted the same analysis on a more 
complex network and compared deterministic results for different cases, such as node or link 
removal, and different architecture.  
DeLaurentis et al. (2012) also analyzed the same five-node network stochastically by 
conducting a Monte Carlo simulation. The simulation gives all the possible initial values to each 
node and computes the operability values. At the end, it comes up with a probability density 
function for each node’s operability value. The study lacks detailed explanation of this process and 
results. By this demonstration, they show that FDNA is useful to analyze the critical nodes of a 
SoS network and assess resiliency of each node.  
Another approach developed by DeLaurentis et al. (2012) is the Development Dependency 
Network Analysis (DDNA). This method borrows concepts from FDNA, Critical Path Method 




(CPM), and Program Evaluation and Review Technique (PERT). The purpose of this method is to 
find the most critical events of a network (series) of systems to be developed in time where some 
of the systems could be started developing before or after the preceding systems are developed. It 
is a more realistic way of assessing the development time based on the dependencies between the 
system than PERT and CPM. 
3.2.1.3. Modifications to FDNA 
There are several aspects that can be used when identifying the characteristics of 
dependencies within a layer and among layers. These are explained below.  
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability Aspects: Value and impact of dependencies 
can be defined as a vector of confidentiality, integrity and availability values. Some attacks just 
target one or a few of these properties of information. Most of the valuation is based on availability 
value. However, for some missions, confidentiality is also vital. So, to assess the impact more 
accurately and simulate the propagation in horizontal and vertical layers, these three properties of 
the information could be used for valuation. 
Self-Efficiency: FDNA assumes that the loss of operability of a node is possible only at 
least one of its feeder nodes’ operability level degrades.  However, there are also cases in which a 
node might fail even if all of its feeder nodes are at full operability level. Therefore, a new 
parameter will be introduced to FDNA algebra to cover this kind of situations.. 
Nature of Dependencies: The dependency relation types of traditional FDNA are not 
sufficient to address the dependencies in cyberspace. For instance, the traditional FDNA is 
shortcoming in two cases which are pretty common in cyber system architectures: (i) Functionality 
of one node is dependent on the operability of more than one node simultaneously, and (ii) 




Functionality of one node is dependent on the operability of any of more than one nodes. New 
dependency operators will be introduced to tackle these issues. 
Time-Dependency in Mission Modeling: Time is an important factor to calculate the 
impact of a cyber action on business processes or missions. The impact varies according to the 
state of the business process. 
From a mission monitoring viewpoint at each particular time, a mission step could be in 
one of the three different states: (a) it could be already completed, (b) it could be in progress, or 
(c) it could be in a state of a planned execution. The overall state of the mission depends on the 
states of the mission tasks: the mission is in a planned state when none of its tasks have been 
started, the mission is an execution state if at least one of its task is an execution state, and finally, 
completion of all mission tasks brings the whole mission into the completed state (Jakobson, 
2011).  
For example, assume that, for Old Dominion University, asset layer includes network 
equipment, cables and computers etc. Service layer includes email service, identity management 
service, internet connection service etc. Mission layer includes delivering online courses. If an 
asset (i.e. router) is degraded because of a cyber attack, then internet connection service fails along 
with some others. This might also cause degradation of the mission, degradation of online courses. 
However, if this cyber incident occurs during a holiday, a time period in which no online courses 
are delivered, it has no impact on the mission. Therefore, time is an important factor that should 
be considered while defining the dependencies.  
3.2.2 Economics of Cybersecurity and Risk 
Economics of information security and cybersecurity investment have been studied for a 
long time. However, in recent years, the number of publications has been increasing due to 




escalating expenditures and loss from security breach apart from the technical problems. Scholars 
suggest different methods to help decision-makers decide how to invest in cybersecurity to protect 
operational excellence and intellectual property. Specific prominent studies to increase the 
efficiency in cybersecurity risk management are reviewed below. Parts of this section have been 
previously published in (Keskin, Tatar, Poyraz, Pinto, & Gheorghe, 2018).  
One relevant study was presented by CAPT Erickson (2016), a cybersecurity figure of 
merit. Erickson states that “The Navy is unable to measure and express cyber program of record 
wholeness, platform cyber readiness, and the impact of programmatic and budgetary decisions on 
cyber readiness, or to quantify the value of specific cybersecurity standards or controls. Without 
an accepted means of holistically scoring risk within a system of systems construct, the Navy 
cannot consistently shape cybersecurity investment priorities to optimize value in a resource 
constrained environment.” The main research problem of Erickson is “how to optimize complex 
cybersecurity investment combinations to provide the maximum value in terms of operational risk 
reduction in resource-constrained environments.” Morse and Drake (2012) developed a 
methodology to cope with acquisition risk. In order to have more realistic and objective risk 
assessment, they proposed a methodology to quantify acquisition risks through data-driven 
monetization. Cybersecurity is not within the scope of their study, but the core is calculating risk 
in monetary values as in this research. 
Shultz and Wydler (2015) studied the integration of cybersecurity into acquisition life-
cycle, a shift from bolt-on security to built-in security. Shultz and Wydler described how the 
government is moving from compliance-based requirements to a risk-based cybersecurity 
management framework to integrate cybersecurity into program acquisition and execution support. 
Kaestner, Arndt, and Dillon-Merrill (2016) focused on embedding cybersecurity during the 




acquisition process to reduce the product life-cycle costs because of the reduced need to fix 
vulnerabilities in the systems later. To attain this goal, the acquisition community must be aware 
of cyber threats and have an understanding of risk assessment. In the recommendations section of 
their article, Kaestner et al. (2016) state that “Risk management experts agree that the first step to 
take is to assess the financial risk of a security breach. This requires a detailed inventory of the 
organization’s assets at risk that will be used to assess the financial risk.” The recommendation of 
Kaestner et al. (2016) is the goal of this study. 
There have been studies to compare different methods to determine the optimal amount to 
invest in cybersecurity. There are comparisons of the economics of cybersecurity, such as game 
theory, optimization theory, use of real data, and security controls selection. Cavusoglu et al. 
(2008) and Fielder et al. (2016) utilized game theory and optimization to compare the two for 
benchmarking efficiency of cybersecurity investments. 
Economics of cybersecurity studies employs optimization methods to address several types 
of problems. For example, an earlier work (Gordon and Loeb 2002) utilized optimization to 
calculate the optimal amount to invest in cybersecurity, and it showed that a small fractional 
amount of the expected loss would be enough to invest in cybersecurity.  
Arora et al. (2004) suggest taking a risk management approach to evaluate information 
security solutions. They indicate that security managers should consider risk-based Return on 
Investment method to decide how to invest in cybersecurity due to so many uncertainties in the 
cyber domain.   
Research on the topics of the economics of cyber risk and cyber insurance –the primary 
method of risk transference– has grown exponentially since 2010. This highlights the increasing 
relevance of the topic, from both a practical and an academic perspective (Eling & Schnell, 2016). 




Sheldon, Abercrombie and Mili (2009) developed the Cyberspace Security Econometrics 
System (CSES). The CSES provides “a measure (i.e., a quantitative indication) of reliability, 
performance and/or safety of a system that accounts for the criticality of each requirement as a 
function of one or more stakeholders’ interests in that requirement. For a given stakeholder, CSES 
accounts for the variance that may exist among the stakes one attaches to meeting each 
requirement”. The stakeholders, with assistance from subject matter experts, define the criteria of 
a quantitative value of an asset. Financial basis (e.g. cost of operational downtime, hardware and 
software costs etc.), standards and regulations such as FISMA, NIST 800-60 and/or FIPS 199/200, 
and stakeholder defined requirements are the quantitative valuation criteria used in the CSES 
method (Abercrombire, Sheldon, & Grimaila, 2010).  
Current methods commonly put more emphasis on technology and less on people, process 
and socio-economic risk factors (Spears, 2005; Tatar, Bahsi and Gheorghe, 2016). Major risk 
assessment approaches, such as ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 standards, are designed based on 
security control domains and focus more on an asset’s security posture while ignoring its 
preparedness towards a set of high-risk loss scenarios (Ruan, 2017). One of the major problems of 
actuaries working in the insurance sector or enterprise risk management is the quantification of 
cyber risk. Almost all the security companies keep incident and loss data as proprietary to have a 
competitive advantage (Ruan, 2017). Subsequently, there is not enough data to employ statistical 
methods and mathematical models for appropriate calculations and predictions. This scarcity of 
data leads analysts to rely on scenario approaches rather than the use of the classical stochastic 
modeling (Lloyd’s, 2015). For Rakes, Deane, and Rees (2012) employing expert judgment to 
define worst-case scenarios and estimate their likelihood for high-impact IT security breaches is a 




more efficient approach. Even more so, fast-changing technology environment requires a modeling 
approach, which dynamically measures risk (Eling & Schnell, 2016). 
3.3 Generalizability and Validity of the Research 
3.3.1 Generalizability of Research 
Generalizability (also referred as external validity) of a research defines the effectiveness 
and usefulness of the research. According to (Polit & Beck, 2010), generalizability is “an act of 
reasoning that involves drawing broad inferences from particular observations”.  
In system engineering research, behavior of the systems is dependent on the system’s 
context. It is always possible to apply the findings of a research to another system context. 
Therefore, attaining generalizability of the research in systems engineering field is difficult. 
Valerdi and Davidz suggested utilizing adequate sampling, random sampling, replicating the 
results in various settings with different methods and using field research to mitigate the 
generalizability problem (Valerdi & Davidz, 2009). 
There are several types of external validity: a) population, b) setting, c) task/stimulus, and 
d) temporal/social.  Population component of external validity deals with “Will the results 
generalize to other persons or animals?” Setting component of external validity deals with “Will 
the findings apply to other settings, situations or locations?” Task Stimuli component of external 
validity deals with “Will the results generalize to other tasks or stimuli?” Societal/temporal 
component of external validity deals with “Will the findings continue to apply as society changes 
over the years?” (Garbin, n.d.). According to Firestone, there are three forms of external validity: 
(1) Statistical generalization, (2) Analytic generalization, (3) Case-to-case transfer of findings 
(Firestone, 1993).  Statistical generalization is extrapolation of findings from a sample to a 
population. For attaining Statistical generalizability, the sample should be representative of the 




population (i.e. random sampling). Analytic generalization is constructing a theory or concept from 
certain findings of the research. Transferability is concerned with the extent to which the findings 
of one study can be applied to other situations. Case-to-case transfer of findings, transferability, is 
applying findings of a research to a similar situation by the readers or users of the research. Since 
the readers of the research transfer the findings of a research to another situation by comparing the 
specifics of the research environment and specifics of the other situation, the researcher should 
provide detailed descriptions of the research environment (Polit and Beck, 2010). 
This research aims to develop an approach to calculate the impact of cyber action by 
considering ripple effects and propagation. First, scarcity of available data is an issue for this study. 
To achieve generalizability, “selecting” the sample data to represent the greater population is not 
possible. Data in the previously published documents will be used. Since the goal of this study is 
to develop an approach, the analytic generalization is more proper for the generalizability of the 
research findings.  
 
3.3.2 Validity of Research 
Validity of modeling and simulation based research consists of conceptual model 
validation, computerized model verification, operational validation, and data validity (Sargent, 
2015). Conceptual model validation is defined as “determining that the theories and assumptions 
underlying the conceptual model are correct and that the model representation of the problem entity 
is “reasonable” for the intended purpose of the model” (Sargent, 2009). Computerized model 
verification is defined as “assuring that the computer programming and implementation of the 
conceptual model is correct” (Sargent, 2009). Operational validation is defined as “determining 
that the model’s output behavior has sufficient accuracy for the model’s intended purpose over the 




domain of the model’s intended applicability” (Sargent, 2009). Data validation is defined as 
“ensuring that the data necessary for model building, model evaluation and testing, and conducting 
the model experiments to solve the problem are adequate and correct” Sargent, 2009). 
Validation during model development is an iterative process. Sargent defines this iterative 
process as depicted in Figure 8. Sargent states that conceptual model validation, computerized 
model verification, operational validation and data validation are the required steps of the iterative 
validation process (Sargent, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 8. Iterative validation process (Sargent, 2015) 
 




There are several validation techniques and tests to validate and verify the model. 
Sensitivity analysis will be used as the primary validation technique.  
Sensitivity analysis (parameter validity) is changing the values of parameters; the effect on 
the output parameters should be checked for representation of the reality (Landry et al., 1983; Law, 
2006; Sargent, 2013). The outputs and the structure can be compared with other models as well 
(Landry et al., 1983). 
 
  





4 MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
This study aims to modify FDNA to develop FDNA-Cyber, which is a new quantitative 
method to (1) determine the cyber impact propagation within a layer (i.e., Asset layer, Service 
layer or Business Process layer), (2) determine the impact propagation among different layers 
within an enterprise, and (3) estimate the economic cost of a cyber incident or event. .  
In this chapter, firstly, complex features of FDNA (i.e., constitutional nodes) ,which are 
mandatory to develop FDNA-Cyber, are explained. Then, modifications to FDNA, such as 
integration of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability concepts, Self Efficiency of nodes, and 
new dependency relations (AND and OR dependencies) are explained. Finally, for the calculation 
of economic cost, cost factors and impact of time on economic consequences are explained. 
4.2 Multiple Component FDNA Nodes 
FDNA is a useful graph theory method to address the following questions.  
“How risk-dependent are capabilities so threats to them can be discovered 
before contributing programs (e.g., suppliers) degrade, fail, or are eliminated?  
and  
What is the effect on the operability of capability if, due to the realization 
of risks, one or more contributing programs or supplier-provider chains degrade, 
fail, or are eliminated.” (Garvey, 2009) 
The major formulas of FDNA are explained in Chapter 3. According to Garvey’s original 
definition (Garvey, 2009), the fundamental equation of FDNA for the operability level of node Py 
that is dependent on the operability levels of h other nodes P1, P2,P3, …, Ph is given by  




0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦� ≤ 100 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦1, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦2, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦3, … , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦ℎ� 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 + 100 �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦�, 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 ,𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 ≤ 100, 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 ≤ 1, 𝑙𝑙 = 1,2,3, … ,ℎ 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 = 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦3, …𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦ℎ� 
𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 = 𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦, 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦 ≤ 100 (1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦)  
where  
SODPy: Strength of Dependency (SOD) equation of Py on feeder nodes P1, P2,P3, …, Ph 
CODPy: Criticality of Dependency (COD) equation of Py on feeder nodes P1, P2,P3, …, Ph 
αly: Strength of dependency fraction of Py on feeder nodes Pl 
βly: The operability level that a receiver node decreases to without its feeder node 
contribution 
Hitherto, FDNA analytics include single component node cases. However, FDNA is also 
a convenient tool where a node is composed of multiple components. Garvey & Pinto (2009) 
describes single component node as the “one that is defined by one and only one component.” A multi 
component node, which is called constituent node, is a special “a node characterized by two or more 
components.” It is always possible to split up a constituent node into at least two distinct 
components. For example, a computer which is composed of memory, storage, processing unit, 
input unit, and output unit– a total of five components – is an example of a constituent node. The 
graphical representation of a constituent node – the computer example – is given in Figure 9. 
A constituent node can be a feeder or receiver node. There are several possible dependency 
relations in which a constituent node can take place. The possible dependency relations of a 
constituent node or its components are (a) dependency of a constituent node with a single node, 




(b) dependency of a constituent node with another constituent node, (c) dependency of a 
component of a constituent node with another component in another constituent node, (d) 
dependency of a component of a constituent node with a component in the same constituent node, 
(e) dependency of a component of a constituent node with another constituent node (as a whole), 




Figure 9. Representation of a constituent node (Garvey & Pinto, 2012) 
 
Operability level of a constituent node is different from a single node’s, which can be 
represented by a single dimensional value function (SDVF). The operability level of constituent 
node is a function of operability levels of its components. As for the single node, operability level 
of each component of a constituent node is represented by its own SDVF. A classical form of 
Keeney-Raiffa additive value function is used to calculate the overall operability of a constituent 
node (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). That means, “the overall operability function of the constituent 
node is a linear additive sum of the component SDVFs” (Garvey, 2009). 
Operability level of a constituent node is different from a single node’s, which can be 
represented by a single dimensional value function (SDVF). The operability level of the 
constituent node is a function of operability levels of its components. As for the single node, 




operability level of each component of a constituent node is represented by its own SDVF. A 
classical form of Keeney-Raiffa additive value function is used to calculate the overall operability 
of a constituent node (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). That means, “the overall operability function of 
the constituent node is a linear additive sum of the component SDVFs” (Garvey, 2009). 
 
Figure 10. Dependency Relations of Constituent Nodes and Single Nodes (Garvey & Pinto, 2012) 
 
For the computer example in Figure 10, operability functions of A, B, C, D, and E are 
represented by SDVFs 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴),𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵),𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶),𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷(𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷),𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸) . The operability of function 
of Pi is as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴) + 𝑤𝑤𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵) + 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶) + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷(𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷) + 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸) 
where 
𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴 + 𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 + 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶 + 𝑤𝑤𝐷𝐷 + 𝑤𝑤𝐸𝐸 = 1 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴),𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥𝐵𝐵),𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶(𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶),𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷(𝑥𝑥𝐷𝐷),𝑉𝑉𝐸𝐸(𝑥𝑥𝐸𝐸) ≤ 100 
A general representation of the operability function of a constituent node Py with k 
components is 









𝑤𝑤1 + 𝑤𝑤2 + 𝑤𝑤3 + ⋯+ 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘 = 1 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖),≤ 100 
4.3 Applicability of FDNA Concepts into Cybersecurity  
FDNA is developed to “enable management to study and anticipate the ripple effects of 
losses in supplier-program contributions on dependent capabilities before risks that threaten these 
suppliers are realized” (Garvey, 2009). FDNA is not developed for a specific application domain 
such as cyber, transportation or electricity; however, it can be applied to model functional 
dependency of any domain. A practitioner who wants to apply FDNA to a domain such as cyber 
security, needs to translate the concepts of FDNA into the concepts of the application domain. In 
this section of the study, major concepts of FDNA will be explained from a cybersecurity point of 
view. 
Strength of Dependency (SOD) and Criticality of Dependency (COD) are the fundamental 
concepts of FDNA. Garvey (2009) defines SOD as “the operability level a receiver node relies on 
receiving from a feeder node for the receiver node to continually increase its baseline operability 
level and ensure the receiver node is wholly operable when its feeder node is wholly operable.” 
From its definition, applicability of SOD into cybersecurity is straightforward. For example, 
assume that there are a PC and a router, components of an IT system that has many other 
components. The PC is used for web browsing.  The router is a networking device that forwards 
data packets between computer networks. In this case, the router is a vital component for the PC’s 
internet connection. If the router’s bandwidth decreases (i.e., the operability level of the router) 
because of a system failure or a cyber-attack (i.e., distributed denial of service attack), this causes 




a decrease in the quality of the PC’s Internet connection (i.e. operability level of PC). In this 
example, if the feeder node’s operability level (i.e., the bandwidth of the router) becomes zero, 
then the operability of the receiver node (i.e., the Internet connection of PC) also becomes zero 
(i.e., baseline operability level).  
Garvey (2009) defines COD as “the operability level a receiver node degrades to from its 
baseline operability level without receiving its feeder node’s contribution.” The presence of a SOD 
between a receiver and a feeder node does not imply a COD exists between them. A COD is present 
between a receiver node and a feeder node only when the receiver degrades from its baseline 
operability level without receiving it feeder node’s contribution. COD does not exist in all 
dependency relations between receiver nodes and feeder nodes in cybersecurity. However, there 
are some cases for which the COD concept is useful to explain the functional dependency between 
a receiver node and a feeder node. For instance, Domain Name System (DNS) is good example to 
explain the COD concept in cybersecurity domain.  The DNS is a service which maps domain 
names such as www.google.com to the IP address(es) of corresponding machine(s) (Shaikh, 
Tewari, & Agrawal, 2001).  DNS is a kind of phone book for the Internet, a phone book that keeps 
the domain names and corresponding IP, addresses instead of persons’ names and their phone 
numbers. There is a hierarchy in the DNS. Each IT asset uses its assigned DNS server to resolve 
the IP address of the system, which it wants to connect. If its own DNS server does not know the 
IP address, the DNS server asks another DNS server, which is at an upper level in the hierarchy. 
Once it resolves the IP address of the destination, then it gives this information to the IT asset, 
which requested first. The DNS server at the bottom level keeps this record for a certain period to 
respond quickly if there is another IP resolution request for the same address. 




DNS servers have an associated time-to-live (TTL) field for each record to limit how long 
the record can be cached by other name servers in the system. TTL values are, typically, on the 
order of days (Barr, 1996). A small TTL value reduces the propagation time through the 
hierarchical DNS servers (i.e., better to have updated records) but increases the load on the name 
server. COD can be used to model the impact of TTL value on the operability level of a DNS 
server. For example, a PC wants to connect a server, www.google.com. First, it queries the IP 
address of www.google.com to its assigned DNS server. If the DNS server has this record in its 
cache, it does not ask any other DNS server and replies to PC with IP information in its cache. If 
the connection of the assigned DNS server with other DNS servers at upper levels of hierarchy is 
lost, it can still reply to IP resolution queries from its cache. However, after a period of TTL value, 
the record will be removed from the cache of the DNS server. After that, DNS server cannot reply 
to any IP resolution requests from its clients if it does not have connection to another DNS server. 
This case can be translated into FDNA concepts as follows. The PC which queries the IP address 
of www.google.com is a receiver node. The PC’s associated DNS server (let’s call it DNS-A) is 
its feeder node to the PC. The other DNS server at the upper level of the hierarchy (let’s call it 
DNS -B) is the feeder node for DNS-A. If DNS –A loses its connection DNS-B, DNS-A is still 
operational for the records it has in its cache. This level is the baseline operability level of DNS-
A. However, after a period of TTL, operability level of DNS-A will be degraded from its baseline 
operability level. This level is called COD for the dependency of DNS-A to DNS-B. 
4.4 Modifications to FDNA to Develop FDNA-Cyber 
This study introduces FDNA-Cyber, a new method based on FDNA to respond to the 
limitations of FDNA in cybersecurity risk analysis. This section explains the rationale behind the 
modifications and new FDNA-Cyber algebra. There are three major modifications to traditional 




FDNA: (a) Self-Efficiency of nodes, (b) Integrating Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
values to nodes, (c) New dependency relations (AND and OR dependencies). 
4.5.1. Self-Efficiency of Nodes 
FDNA is instrumental in modeling the ripple effects between functionally dependent 
nodes. FDNA assumes that the loss of operability of a node is possible only at least one of its 
feeder nodes’ operability level degrades.  Although this condition holds in cyberspace, there are 
other possibilities, which might cause degradation of operability of a receiver node while all of its 
feeder nodes are fully operational. For example, for the PC and router example in Section 4.3, the 
PC might fail because of a system error or a cyber-attack even though the router is fully 
operational. The operability level of the PC might degrade because of the failure. Therefore, a new 
parameter should be introduced to FDNA algebra to cover this kind of situation. 
A new parameter, Self-Efficiency, is developed to enhance FDNA for covering situations 
in which the receiver node’s operability degrades while all of the feeder nodes are fully operational. 
Self-Efficiency of a node is a multiplier to its operability level based on SOD and COD 
dependencies with its feeders. The new FDNA equations for a 2-node graph (Figure 12) are given 
below. This self-efficiency formula is different than the self effectiveness formula developed by 
(Guariniello & DeLaurentis, 2014a). 
 





Figure 11. A 2-Node FDNA Graph 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗  (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗�) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�,𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�) 
where    SEj is self-efficiency of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸 ≤ 1 
αij is the strength of dependency fraction between Pi and Pj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
βij is the criticality of dependency between Pi and Pj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
4.5.2. Integrating Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability 
Like many others, NIST standards require valuation of assets in terms of their 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values. This three dimensional valuation enables 
differentiating each type of attack and its respective impact. In FDNA-Cyber model, value and 
impact of dependencies is defined as a vector of confidentiality, integrity and availability values.  




Each node (i.e., an asset, service or business process) of FDNA-Cyber graph has its own 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values. Constitutional node representation of FDNA is 
instrumental to defining FDNA-Cyber nodes (Figure 12).  
 
 
Figure 12. An FDNA-Cyber node 
 
Similar to the classical form of the Keeney-Raiffa additive value function which is used to 
calculate the overall operability of a constituent node (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976), operability level 
of a FDNA-Cyber node is a function of operability levels of its components – Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability values. That means the overall operability function of a FDNA-Cyber 
node is a linear additive sum of the single dimensional value functions of Confidentiality, Integrity 
and Availability. 
For the example in Figure 12, operability functions of Ci, Ii, and Ai are represented by 
SDVFs 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�, 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖�𝑥𝑥𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖� . The operability function of Pi is as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
where 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 




𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 ≤ 100 
To define the FDNA-Cyber algebra, several FDNA-Cyber dependency equations are 
developed based on examples.  
Example 1: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 13 
 
 
Figure 13. A 2-node FDNA-Cyber graph 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 13 consists of two nodes Pi , and Pj.. The equations for 
operability level of each single node – Pi , and Pj – without considering the dependencies are as 
follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 




𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖),𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 ,  
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 ∀ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴}, 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
At first, let’s start from a basic scenario. Let’s assume that there is only one dependency 
point. If this dependency is from Ci to Cj, then the FDNA-Cyber equation is as follows. 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖�) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�) 
where  SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
If this dependency is from Ii to Ij, then the FDNA-Cyber equation is as follows. 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�) 
where  SEIj is self-efficiency of Integrity component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi and VIj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi and VIj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 




If this dependency is from Ai to Aj, then the FDNA-Cyber equation is as follows. 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖�) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�) 
where  SEAj is self-efficiency of Availability component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
When we consider all of the five dependency points in Figure 13 (i.e., dependencies from 
Ci to Cj, from Ii to Ij, from Ii to Cj, from Ii to Aj, from Ai to Aj), the FDNA-Cyber dependency 
function for this graph is given by the following equations. 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�)  
  𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�) = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)) 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖�)  
 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗)) 
 




where  SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEIj is self-efficiency of Integrity component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi and VIj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi and VIj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEAj is self-efficiency of Availability component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
Example 2: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 14 
 





Figure 14. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 14 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1 , Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 




0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
∀ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴}: 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
The FDNA-Cyber dependency function for the graph in Figure 14 is given by the following 
equations. 




 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2�,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2�) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 �𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗)) 
 




 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗)) 
 




where  SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEIj is self-efficiency of Integrity component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VIj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VIj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEAj is self-efficiency of Availability component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 




𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
Example 3: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 15 
 
Figure 15. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 15 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1 , Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 




𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
∀ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴}: 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2,≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 100 
The FDNA-Cyber dependency function for the graph in Figure 15 is given by the following 
equations. 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2)) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2)) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2)) 
 








 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗)) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2�,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2�) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 =  𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 �𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗))  




 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴(𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 −
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�� ,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗)) 
 
where  SECi2 is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pi2 and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCi2 and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCi2 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VIi2 and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VIi2 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2) 




𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi1 and VAi2 and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 is the criticality of dependency between VAi1 and VAi2 and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2) 
∀ 𝑋𝑋 ∈ {𝑀𝑀1, 𝑀𝑀2, 𝑗𝑗}: 0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑋𝑋,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑋𝑋,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑋𝑋 ≤ 100 
SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
SEIj is self-efficiency of Integrity component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VIj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VIj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
SEAj is self-efficiency of Availability component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 




𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
4.5.3. AND Gate Integration 
In cyberspace, dependency relationships of classical FDNA are not sufficient to model the 
types of dependencies of some FDNA-Cyber nodes (i.e., assets, services or business processes). 
For instance, if there are two databases in a system and an application server needs to query both 
of them concurrently (e.g. querying user’s social security number from one database and user’s 
date of birth from another database) to respond to a request coming from a web server (i.e., a user’s 
social security number and date of birth), the dependencies of the application server to database 
servers cannot be modeled by two feeder one receiver node dependency of classical FDNA 
algebra. A new concept – AND gate – is developed to expand the classical FDNA algebra to cover 




Figure 16. AND dependency of a 3-node FDNA graph 





The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 16 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of the receiver node –Pj – as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2��) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2 �) 
 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 + 100 �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗� ,𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 + 100 �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗� ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗�) 
where SEj is self-efficiency of of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between Pi1 and Pj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between Pi1 and Pj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between Pi2 and Pj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between Pi2 and Pj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗) 
To define the FDNA-Cyber algebra with AND gate, several FDNA-Cyber dependency 
equations are developed based on examples.  
Example 4: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 17 





Figure 17. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with AND gate dependency 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 17 consists of three nodes Pi1, Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1, Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 




∀ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴}: 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2,≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2 ≤ 100 
The FDNA-Cyber dependency function for the graph in Figure 17 is given by the following 
equations. 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2��) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2�) 
 
 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 +
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�) 
 
Where SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
Example 5: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 18 





Figure 18. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with AND gate dependency 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 18 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1 , Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
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𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
4.5.4. OR Gate Integration 
To increase resiliency of a critical cyber system, adding redundant components to the 
system is an established practice. A redundant server is a replica of the primary server with the 




same (or sometimes similar) computing power, storage capacity, applications, etc. A redundant 
server is not active until the primary server fails. Once the primary server loses its operability, the 
redundant server becomes active and takes the responsibilities of the primary server to prevent 
system failure or downtime. 
Dependency relationships of classical FDNA are not sufficient to model redundant nodes. 
A new concept – OR gate – is developed to expand the classical FDNA algebra to cover such 




Figure 19. OR dependency of a 3-node FDNA graph 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 19 consists of three nodes Pi1, Pi2, and Pj. The equations 
for operability level of the receiver node –Pj – are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖1�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖2��) 




 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 + 100 �1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗� ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗� ,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 �𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 +
100 �1 −  𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗� ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗��) 
where SEj is self-efficiency of of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between Pi1 and Pj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between Pi1 and Pj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between Pi2 and Pj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between Pi2 and Pj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑗𝑗) 
To define the FDNA-Cyber algebra with AND gate, several FDNA-Cyber dependency 
equations are developed based on examples.  
Example 6: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 20 
 
Figure 20. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with OR gate dependency 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 20 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1 , Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 




𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 < 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
The FDNA-Cyber dependency function for the graph in Figure 20 is given by the following 
equations. 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2��) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 +
100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗��) 
 
Where SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 




𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
Example 7: Formulate the FDNA equations for the graph in Figure 21 
 
Figure 21. A 3-node FDNA-Cyber graph with OR gate dependency 
 
The FDNA-Cyber graph in Figure 21 consists of three nodes Pi , Pi2, and Pj.. The equations 
for operability level of each single node – Pi1 , Pi2 and Pj – without considering the dependencies 
are as follows. 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 1 
𝑤𝑤𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 + 𝑤𝑤𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 1 




𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1)  
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2),𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2), 
𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�𝑋𝑋𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑋𝑋𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
0 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2,𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
∀ 𝑋𝑋,𝑌𝑌 ∈ {𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼,𝐴𝐴}: 0 < 𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ,𝛼𝛼𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗,𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖2𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 














 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 +
100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2 +
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗��) 
 
𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2��) 
 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 +
100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗��) 
 















 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 = 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗(𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 �𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 +
100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2 +
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀�𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 100�1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗�,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2 + 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗��) 
 
Where SECj is self-efficiency of Confidentiality component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VCi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VCi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEIj is self-efficiency of Integrity component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VIj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VIj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VCj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 




𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VCj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
SEAj is self-efficiency of Availability component of Pj and 0 ≤ 𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VAi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VAi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi1 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi1 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖1𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the strength of dependency fraction between VIi2 and VAj and  0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 1 
𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 is the criticality of dependency between VIi2 and VAj and 0 ≤ 𝛽𝛽𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100(1 − 𝛼𝛼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖2𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗) 
0 ≤ 𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖1,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖2,𝑉𝑉𝐴𝐴𝑗𝑗 ≤ 100 
4.5 Cost Calculation Model 
4.5.1. Cost Factors for an Adverse Cyber Event 
Economic cost of cyber actions is an important parameter for well-informed decisions and 
cyber risk bridging the communication gap between technical and senior level decision makers. 
Cost components of an adverse cyber event vary in terms of the magnitude of associated cost and 
difficulty in calculating the cost. According to the Council of Economic Advisors (2018), based 
on the previous studies by Federal Bureau of Investigation (2017), Verizon (2017), and the Open 
Web Application security Project (2014), there are 13 cost factors of an adverse cyber event: (1) 
Loss of IP, (2) Loss of strategic information, (3) Reputational damage, (4) Increased cost of capital, 
(5) Cybersecurity improvements, (6) Loss of data and equipment, (7) Loss of revenue, (8) Public 




relations, (9) Regulatory penalties, (10) Customer protection, (11) Breach notification, (12) Court 
settlement fees, and (13) Forensics. The comparison of difficulty of quantifying cost and 
magnitude of cost is given in Figure 22.  
A cyber-attack might cause some or all of the costs listed above. For instance, a distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attack targeting an online retail company causes disruption of operability 
of the IT systems and business processes. First, in the short term, the company loses sales during 
the disruption. In the mid-run, the company loses its future revenue since some of the customers 
switch to another company in the market because of the unavailability of the service. According 
to the magnitude of the attack, there may exist reputational damage, which may “tarnish the firm’s 
brand name, reducing its future revenues and business opportunities” (Council of Economic 
Advisors (2018). To reduce the impact of reputational damage, the company should pay public 
relations efforts to mitigate this damage.  
Another scenario is the costs incurred because of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) 
attack targeting the intellectual property and strategic information of a company. The company 
loses its competitive advantage because of the stolen intellectual property and strategic 
information. The stolen intellectual property might be owned and utilized by the company’s rivals. 
The company loses it future revenue. To find the attacker, the company spends on forensics to 
identify the perpetrator, and court settlement fees. The cost of capital, which  “is the required return 
necessary to make a capital budgeting project … and is used by companies internally to judge 
whether a capital project is worth the expenditure of resources, and by investors who use it to 
determine whether an investment is worth the risk compared to the return” (Kenton, 2018), also 




increases since the investors think the company did not protect the intellectual property adequately 
(Council of Economic Advisors (2018). 
In the case of a data breach of a personally identifiable information (PII) of customers or 
employees of a company might result regulatory penalties, breach notification and customer 
protection costs. A ransomware attack might result loss of data. For all the scenarios listed above, 
the attacked company needs to invest in cybersecurity to mitigate the cyber risks and reduce 
vulnerabilities to prevent re-occurring of a similar cyber incident.  
 
 
Figure 22. Cost factors of an adverse cyber event (Adapted from Council of Economic Advisors 
(2018)) 





4.5.2. Impact of Time and Duration to Cyber Cost 
The impact of a cyber-attack is related to the value of the targeted asset, service and 
business process. The value of each of these factors might differ. For example, the costs of loss of 
availability of an online retail system during business hours and hours from 2 am to 5 pm are 
different. The duration is also an important factor of incurred cost of a cyber-incident. The duration 
of a cyber-attack impacts the attack’s magnitude. For instance, if a DDoS attack lasts days, the 
associated costs (i.e. loss of revenue, loss of reputation etc.) will be higher than a similar attack 
that lasts hours.  
The cost of a cyber-action should be a function of time and duration of the attack. 
4.5.3. Case Study: Economic Impact of a DDoS Attack Targeting a Higher 
Education Institute 
In this section, a case study of DDoS attack targeting a higher education institute is 
discussed to demonstrate the importance of time and duration in calculating economic impact of a 
cyber incident. Parts of this section have been previously published as (Keskin, Tatar, et al., 2018). 
4.5.3.1. Background of Online Learning at Higher Education Institutes 
Traditionally, higher education is held in classrooms with professors lecturing to students. 
In the last few decades, this has been changing in some degree with the synchronous and 
asynchronous (e.g., CD-ROM) distance learning education methods. Before the wide use of the 
internet, institutes employed televised delivery methods via satellites for the synchronous distance 
learning. Later, this approach was almost completely abandoned and the internet has become the 
platform for distance learning courses. The reasons why higher education institutes have started 
offering their courses and programs online are to reach more students and increase their tuition 




income.  Many higher education institutes offer distance learning degrees or at least some distance 
learning courses. According to the U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education 
Statistics (2016), “In fall 2014, there were 5,750,417 students enrolled in any distance education 
courses at degree-granting postsecondary institutions.”  
Distance learning programs help to deliver higher education to anyone who has an internet 
connection anywhere in the world. However, distance learning highly depends on the internet. 
Quality of the classes is easily affected by low bandwidth and unreliable internet service. The 
bandwidth issue is attributed more to the student end. However, the reliability of internet service 
is much more important at the university end. Given that the universities that provide distance 
learning have the internet infrastructure to provide a sufficiently good quality stream, no problems 
are expected. Nevertheless, parallel to the developments in the internet and technology, cyber 
attacks are also eveloved over time. Universities are among the top targets of the Distributed 
Denial-of-Service (DDOS) attacks (Cloudbric, 2017; McMurdie, 2017), which result in business 
interruption. As well, according to the researchers at Akamai Technologies, U.S. colleges and 
universities are facing an increase in DDoS attacks (Walker, 2017).  
In this study, an economics based framework to calculate the economic impact of DDoS 
attacks is developed. The framework is applied to a distance learning system of a higher education 
institute.  
4.5.3.2. Research Problem 
Distance learning programs have become popular. However, distance learning requires 
continuous, high quality internet connection. This step into cyberspace also comes with the risk of 
cyber attacks. DDoS attacks can disrupt course delivery and cause financial consequences. 
Decision makers in the university management need a method to choose the best risk mitigation 




strategy to withstand the impact of DDoS attacks. Accordingly, the research question is: “How to 
calculate the economic impact of business interruption caused by DDoS attacks targeting a 
distance learning infrastructure?”  
Quantifying cybersecurity risk in monetary values would help make better decisions while 
choosing a risk mitigation strategy. There are several methods of cybersecurity risk mitigation: 
risk control (i.e. reducing the consequence or likelihood), risk acceptance, risk avoidance, and risk 
transferal (Pinto & Garvey, 2012). This approach will also increase temporal accuracy in 
acquisition roadmaps, precision on requirements management and effective financial planning.  
1.5.3.2.1. Model 
In this study, a model to support decision making for choosing risk mitigation strategies is 
developed. Decision makers need to define methods to predict the possible cost of risk events. The 
model depends on the predicted Cost of Impact of a DDoS attack. Based on the magnitude of the 
cost, the model helps to choose different strategies based on The Mitigation Strategy Selection 
Algorithm is shown in Figure 23. 
 
Condition 1: When the Cost of Impact ($Imp) is less than or equal to the sum of Insurance 
Deductible ($Ded) and Premium ($Prm), then decision makers should consider accepting the risk 
since the impact is negligible.  
Condition 2: While Condition 1 is False, if the sum of Insurance Deductible ($Ded), 
Premium ($Prm) and the difference between Cost of Impact ($Imp) and Insurance Coverage 
($Cov) is less than the Cost of Control ($Ctl), then the decision makers should consider transferring 




the risk. Since the Cost of Impact ($Imp) is too much to accept but not high enough to exceed the 
Cost of Control, transferring the risk is the best option in this situation. 
Condition 3: If both Condition 1 and 2 are False, the decision makers should consider 
choosing the risk control strategy. Because the Cost of Impact is too much to be accepted and also 
too much from the insurance coverage amount, the best option is to control risk.  
For this model, risk avoidance is not an appropriate risk mitigation strategy since it is 




Figure 23. The Mitigation Strategy Selection Algorithm 
 
Predicting the Cost of impact is an integral part of this model. It depends on the direct 
impact and indirect impact as shown in Equation 1. 
$𝐼𝐼:𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶, 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑎𝑎𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶)    (1) 
The Indirect Impact includes the cost of reputation damage, legal procedures, productivity 
decline, customer turnover, personnel time spent addressing and recovering from the outage and 
incremental helpdesk expenses (Arbor Networks, 2016; Granidello et. al, 2016). Estimating the 




Indirect Impact is harder. Some methods could be developed to estimate the factors that constitute 
the Indirect Impact. For instance, in the distance learning systems, the cost of reputation basically 
depends on the enrollment along years and is affected by the reputation of the distance learning 
programs of the higher education institute. Because of the scarcity of data to quantify the Indirect 
Impact, it is out of the scope of this study. 
In this study, a model is proposed to gauge the Direct Impact. The higher education 
institutes do not loss money directly when a DDoS attack occurs when compared to an online store 
or gambling site. However, they need a way of calculating the value of the online service 
availability. As shown in the Equation 2, Direct Impact can be calculated as a function of the 
duration of the DDoS attack and the number of students who are connected to the distance learning 
program during this time period. 
𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆 𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀,𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)    (2) 
DDoS duration can be a couple of minutes or may go up to days. The number of connected 
students depends on the number and type of the courses held during this period (See the Equation 
3). Graduate and undergraduate courses typically have a different number of enrolled students and 
different tuition rates. 
  
𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶,𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶)   (3) 
 
Number and type of the courses depend on the course schedule. Hence, the day of the week 
and the time of the day as shown in the Equation 4. 





𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑊𝑊,𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝑓𝑓 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐴𝐴 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇)   (4) 
4.5.3.3. Application of the model on distance learning data 
The model is applied to real-world data from Old Dominion University distance learning 
system. 
4.5.3.3.1. Data collection and preparation 
Schedule data of distance learning courses in Spring 2017 term is used. Based on Equation 
4, Number of Courses depend on the Day of the Week and the Time of the Day. Figure 1 illustrates 
equation 4 by representing the number of courses offered on each day. There are no courses on 
weekends and in the late hours; therefore, these hours are not included in the plot. 
 
 
Figure 24. Total number of distance learning courses for each day 
 
In addition to the course schedule, data for enrollment, tuition rates, and domicile is 
included in the study. Based on the Equation 3, the type of the courses is also needed. The tuition 




rates are different for undergraduate and graduate students. It also differs based on domicile. 
Commonly, out-of-state students pay more tuition than in-state students (See Table 4). 
 
Table 4. Data for domicile, tuition rates, and types of courses 
 
 
Based on the enrollment data, total student credit hours registered to distance learning 
courses for this semester are 52,200 for undergraduate and 11,388 for graduate level. A course 
requires 3 credit hours. There are 81 undergraduate, 76 graduate courses, and 27 courses for both 
undergraduate and graduate levels. Based on these numbers, the average value of a 15-minute 
period for one course is $1,250.71 for undergraduate level and $428.98 for graduate level. Based 
on the data given above, the value of streaming for 15-minute periods for each day is visualized in 
Figure 25. This figure shows the direct impact values (mentioned in the Equation 2) for these time 
periods without considering the duration of the DDoS attacks.  
Figure 2 and Figure 3 have some similarities and differences.  
Similarities: 
• Trends for each day are similar at each graph. If there is no course within a period of time, 
the dollar value is also zero (e.g. Wednesday, 3.45 pm; Friday, 8.30 am).  
• When the plot in either figures peaks, the related plot in the other figure also reaches a peak 
(e.g. Thursday, 6 pm).  





• The vertical axis represents the number of courses in Figure 2 while it stands for the dollar 
value of each 15-minute-period in Figure 3. 
• The graphs in Figure 3 have higher values before 4 pm. This is because most of the 
undergraduate courses are held until 4 pm and these courses have many more enrolled 
students on average than the graduate courses. This increases their value even if the tuition 
rates for the undergraduate level are lower. 
 
 
Figure 25. Value of Stream for 15-minute periods for each day (Direct impact without duration 
information) 
 
The Direct impact in Equation 2 is calculated using the duration of the DDoS attack and 
the number of students. Figure 25 is not a cumulative plot. It gives the value of each specific 15-
minute period of service interruption. DDoS attacks commonly last hours or, in some cases, days. 




In order to calculate the direct impact of the DDoS attack, the point values given in Figure 25 
should be cumulatively added.  
For example, the direct impact of a DDoS attack with a duration of 12 hours that occurs on 
Monday between, 10 am and 10 pm is $355,955. This value is calculated by cumulatively adding 
48 data points within this time period. Table 5 presents direct impact values for 12-hour DDoS 
attacks. Rows specify the start time and the columns specify the day of the week. (+1) in rows 
indicates that this attack ends on the succeeding day. Darker shading of cells indicates the higher 
impact. Thus, it can be said that the highest impact of a 12-hour DDoS can be reached if it starts 
on a Thursday morning at 10 am.  
 
Table 5. 12-hour DDoS attack impact 
 
 
Another representation of the values in Table 5 is provided in Figure 26 as a three-
dimensional surface plot. Vertical axes represent the attack start day and time while vertical axis 
stands for the direct impact. It can be seen that the highest impact value for a 12-hour DDoS is 
reached by an attack that starts on Thursday morning. It can be observed that attacks starting in 
the afternoon have less impact since there are no classes at night.  
 





Figure 26. Direct impact of a 12-hour DDoS attack 
 
Figure 27 depicts the direct impact values for 72-hour DDoS attacks. The highest impact, 
which is almost $M 1.16, is reached by the attack that starts on Monday at 7 pm because this attack 
includes the highest demand hours. The impact has lower values for later days of the week since 
the attack covers the weekend.  
 





Figure 27. Direct impact of a 72-hour DDoS attack 
 
4.5.3.3.2. Simulation results 
To conduct a simulation, the attack is considered to start on Monday at 8 am. Figure 28 
represents the Cost of Impact and costs of different risk mitigation strategies. One can compare 
these functions and choose the best strategy based on the risk tolerance of the organization by 
using this model and plotting the costs.  
For this simulation, the insurance coverage is designated as one million dollars. For 
simplicity, the deductible and premium amounts are designated as %10 and 1/200 of the coverage, 
respectively (Skinner, 2017). The average risk control strategy cost is designated as $240,000 
(Cdwg, 2017) (See Table 6). 
 




Table 6. Risk Mitigation Strategy Costs 
 
 
4.5.3.3.2.1. Risk acceptance 
Accepting the risk is basically not taking any precaution. Therefore, the cost of DDoS 
attack when the risk is accepted is equal to the Cost of Impact. In Figure 28, orange line represents 
this value. The attack starts on Monday morning and it continues. Cost of Impact increases while 
there are distance learning courses and stands constantly when there is no class, e.g. during nights. 
The dollar value for an end time t is the total cost if the attack lasts until the time t. This is applicable 
to all three risk mitigation strategies. 
4.5.3.3.2.2. Risk control 
Risk control means taking precaution to decrease the consequence of risk event. In this 
study, it is considered to acquire a product that prevents the DDoS attack to interrupt online 
services. In Figure 28, yellow straight line represents the Cost of Control. It is constant since the 
organization pays its cost in the beginning. It doesn’t increase because it prevents an attack to 
happen. Thus, there is no additional Cost of Impact. 
4.5.3.3.2.3. Risk transfer 
Transferring the risk is buying an insurance coverage. The organization pays the Premium 
in the beginning. If an attack occurs, based on the Cost of Impact, the insurance company pays the 




cost, or the insured organization pays the deductible. In Figure 28, orange line represents these 
values cumulatively. 
If the Cost of Impact exceeds the Deductible but not the Coverage amount, insured pays 
only the deductible. 
If the cost of Impact exceeds the Coverage amount, the insured organization pays the 
deductible and the uncovered amount, which is equal to the difference between the Cost of Impact 
and Coverage. 
In Figure 28, the gray line represents the cost that is paid by the insured higher education 
institute. It starts at $5,000, which is the Premium amount, at the beginning. It increases while the 
Cost of Impact increases until it reaches the value of the sum of Deductible and Premium. When 
the Cost of Impact reaches the Coverage amount, which is $1M, it again starts increasing at the 
same rate that the Cost of Impact increases (After the blue dashed line).  
4.5.3.3.2.4. Comparison of risk mitigation strategies 
The main goal of this approach is to minimize the cost to the higher education institute. In 
Figure 28, red stars indicate the important points that the best risk mitigation strategy changes. 
These stars indicate the IF conditions satisfaction values in the model algorithm provided in Figure 
23.  
From Monday, 8 am to 3:15 pm, the lowest cost values are provided by risk acceptance 
strategy. At 3:15 pm, the Cost of Impact ($107,509) exceeds the Cost of Transfer ($105,000), 
which is equal to the sum of Premium and Deductible. Before this point, the minimum cost to the 
institute is received by accepting the risk. If the organization doesn’t expect a DDoS attack more 
than 7 hours and 15 minutes, the decision makers would consider taking no action against the 
DDoS threat.  




From Monday, 3:15 pm to Thursday, 2:15 pm, i.e. between two red stars, risk transferal is 
the best strategy. If the organization expects an attack more than 7 hours and 15 minutes up to 78 
hours and 15 minutes, the decision makers should consider buying a million-dollar insurance 
coverage. Buying a risk control product is still not a good practice for this situation due to its high 
cost. 
If the organization expects an attack that may last more than 78 hours and 15 minutes, the 
decision makers should consider choosing the risk control strategy and buying the product for 
$240,000 because after Thursday, 2:15 pm, other strategies cause higher costs to the institution. 
 
 
Figure 28. Cost of Impact and Mitigation Strategies 
 
4.5.3.4. Limitations 
This study has several limitations. First, different types of DDoS attacks, the bandwidth of 
the target system and attack size (in Gb/sec) are not considered. It is assumed that the DDoS attack 
is successful and just results in business interruption. Second, only the cost of service loss is used 




to quantify the monetary value of business interruption. The factors that constitute Indirect Impact 
such as legal procedures, help desk costs, and reputation loss are ignored. Also, business 
interruption of the university’s other online services is ignored since they do not have a significant 
impact. 
4.5.3.5. Conclusions  
This study develops an economic framework to distinguish economic viability among 
different risk mitigation strategies against DDoS in distance learning systems of higher education 
institutes. Publicly available data is used to apply the framework on a real world case. This 
framework may apply to other cybersecurity incidents (e.g. ransomware) resulting to business 
interruption. This framework shows that the risk mitigation strategy selection depends on many 
aspects. The amount of insurance coverage can affect the effectiveness of risk transfer strategy. 
One of the most important things to know is the likelihood of a long duration DDoS attack to 
happen. Decision makers should consider these aspects to occur with the most viable solution. 
Future work will include availability of other online services, such as website access, web 
applications, and archived courses. It will also include indirect impact factors that are not 
considered in this study. 
4.5.4. Formula for Calculating Cost of a Cyber Action 
Economic impact of a cyber action is calculated based on the loss of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability at the business process level. For each potential cost identified by the 
Council of Economic Advisors (2018), relevant potential cost factors are identified (Table 7).  
 
 




Table 7. Relation of potential consequences and cost factors (confidentiality, integrity and 
availability) 
 Cost Factors  
Potential Consequences C I A Parameter 
Loss of IP X   Ct1 
Loss of Strategic Information X X X Ct2 
Reputational Damage X X X Ct3 
Increased Cost of Capital X   Ct4 
Cybersecurity Improvements X X X Ct5 
Loss of data and Equipment X X X Ct6 
Loss of Revenue X X X Ct7 
PR X X X Ct8 
Regulatory Penalties X X X Ct9 
Customer Protection X   Ct10 
Breach Notifications X   Ct11 
Court Settlement Fees X X X Ct12 
Forensics X X X Ct13 
 
Time and duration are also used as parameters in cost calculation.  
The economic cost calculation formulas are given below. 
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1) = 𝑓𝑓(�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�, �𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�, �𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�) 
𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶4,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶7,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶9,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶10,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶11,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶12,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶13) 
𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3, ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶7,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶9,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶12,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶13) 
𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1 = 𝐴𝐴(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶3, ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶5,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶6,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶7,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶8,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶9,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶12,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶13) 








where 𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1is the cost of loss of confidentiality for BP1,  
 𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1is the cost of loss of integrity for BP1, 
  𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1is the cost of loss of availability for BP1, 
t is the time when impact of cyber action is observed, 
d is the duration of cyber action. 
  





5 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the FDNA-Cyber methodology is applied in several hypothetical cases. In 
these cases, the network topology in Figure 29 is used. The dependency data (i.e., SOD, COD etc.) 
is generated in Microsoft Excel.  
5.2 Case 1: Impact Propagation and Cost Calculation 
5.2.1 Build a simple 3-tier network to compare cost and impact difference as per the 
attacked asset(s)  
In order to conduct analyses and show the capabilities of the model proposed, a simple 3-
tier network is built. The sample network consists of fifteen assets, seven services, five tasks, and 
four business processes (See Figure 29). Six of the assets are root nodes meaning that they do not 
have any dependency on any other node. Two of the business processes are leaf nodes, which don’t 
have any child node. All other nodes have dependency on at least one node and at least one 
dependent node.  





Figure 29. Sample 3-tier enterprise network 
 




The inputs of the model are: 
1. Network topology (dependency structure), 
2. Asset Self Effectiveness, 
3. Alpha and Beta values for each dependency relationship, 
4. Time of the day that an attack starts and duration of the attack, 
5. Weights of CIA values on the operability of a node 
6. Cost values for each potential consequence for CIA. 
The outputs of the model are: 
1. CIA values of each node, 
2. Operability of each node, 
3. Cost of not continuing the operation of Business Processes. 
During the analyses, as an input, the Self Effectiveness values of asset nodes are given. All 
of the other inputs have been kept constant for simplicity. All alpha values are kept as 1 meaning 
that there is a high strength of dependency among nodes. All beta values are kept as 50, thus there 
is a moderate criticality of dependency among nodes. Cost values are generated randomly within 
5.2.2 List effected assets/services/task/business processes  
The first analysis that is conducted lists which nodes are affected when an asset is degraded 
to zero Self Effectiveness. As shown in Table 8, when Asset 1 has a zero Self Effectiveness, Asset 
(A) 7, A9, A13, Service (S) 1, S2, S5, S6, Task (T) 1, T2, T5, Business Process (B) 1, and B2 are 
affected. This means that operability of these nodes are degraded from 100 and not working at a 
full capacity anymore. As can be seen here, when A5 or A6 degraded to zero, it doesn’t affect any 
other nodes since A12 has an OR dependency on these two nodes. In this case, even if either of 




them fails, the other one and A12 would still operate normally. Therefore, the OR dependency is 
a good way of providing redundancy.  
 
Table 8. List of affected nodes when each asset is degraded to zero one by one 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
A7 A8 A8 A11 
  
A9 A10 A13 A13 A14 A15 S1 S2 S4 
A9 A9 A10 A14 
  
A13 A13 S1 A14 A15 S4 S2 S3 S7 
A13 A10 A11 A15 
  
S1 A14 S2 S1 S2 S7 S5 S4 T3 
S1 A13 A13 S2 
  
S2 S1 S5 S2 S3 T3 S6 S6 T4 
S2 A14 A14 S3 
  
S5 S2 S6 S3 S4 T4 T1 S7 B2 
S5 S1 A15 S4 
  
S6 S3 T1 S4 S6 B2 T2 T2 B3 
S6 S2 S1 S6 
  
T1 S4 T2 S5 S7 B3 T5 T3 B4 
T1 S3 S2 S7 
  
T2 S5 T5 S6 T2 B4 B1 T4 
 
T2 S4 S3 T2 
  




T5 S5 S4 T3 
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5.2.3 Cost graph for B1-4 
After listing the nodes affected by degradation of the assets, the cost of not operating is 
computed for each asset’s degraded scenario. The only nodes that directly cause cost are Business 
Processes. All the other nodes indirectly affect cost through the dependencies. Figure 30 presents 
the total cost and individual costs caused by each business process when each asset is degraded to 
zero. The horizontal axis represents the Asset that is degraded to zero starting with the case that 
no asset is degraded and then goes up from Asset 1 to Asset 15. Stacked columns represent the 
total cost while they are separated by colors to indicate the proportions that are caused by specific 
Business Processes.  
As it can be seen from Figure 30, A5 and A6 do not cause any cost. This situation is in 
alignment with Table 8. Most of the scenarios cause less than $15 million. A3, A4, and A11 cause 
the most at almost $24 million.  
ti = 2 (Thursday) di = 1.07 (7.29 days) 
 
Figure 30. Total cost caused by each failed asset 




Figure 31 also shows the total costs caused by degrading the assets one by one. The 
difference is that it represents the cost related to confidentiality, integrity, and availability portions 
of the Business Process nodes. Since there are more types of sources of cost for confidentiality 
than integrity and availability, costs regarding confidentiality are generally more than the others.  
 
 
Figure 31. Total costs caused by CIA 
 
5.2.4 Time/Duration impact 
According to the cost equation below, cost of losses for Business operations depends on 
the time the event causing the loss starts and duration it continues since when an attack starts and 
how long it continues change its effect. In this simulation, ti is related to the day of the week and 
determined according to randomly selected day. ti is 3 for an attack that starts on Monday and 




Tuesday, 2 for an attack that starts on Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, and 1 for an attack that 
starts on Saturday and Sunday.  
𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 (𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1) = 𝑓𝑓(�𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�, �𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�, �𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃1, 𝐶𝐶,𝑎𝑎�) 
di is a decimal number between 1 and 1.3. The simulation assigns a random number from 0 to 30 
to indicate the days that the attack continues. It computes the di based on this number by 
interpolation.  
For the calculations for Figure 2 and 3, ti is equal to 2 (Thursday) and di is equal to 1.07 
(7.29 days). In order to show the effect of time and duration, the analysis shown in Figure 32 is 
conducted with ti = 3 (Tuesday) di = 1.2 (18.42) day. As it can be observed in this graph, most of 
the total cost values are below $25 million while three of them are close to $40 million. This is 
because the time and duration factors are higher in the latter scenario. 
In order to make comparison simple, ti and di are kept constant for the all other analyses as equal 
to 2 (Thursday) and 1.07 (7.29 days), respectively. 
 





Figure 32. Total cost caused by each failed asset with a different time and duration 
 
5.3 Case 2: Redundancy – Resiliency  
5.3.1 Most critical asset analysis 
Based on the dependency structure of the network, some nodes are considered more critical 
than others. There may be multiple measures to determine which nodes are critical. These measures 
may be the number of nodes whose operability levels have been degraded and the total cost they 
cause when they are degraded.  
Determining the critical assets is an important action for decision makers within 
enterprises. This information is crucial to making investment decisions for risk mitigation 
strategies. 




5.3.1.1 Find most critical asset(s) (i.e. asset(s) having most impact) for each BP 
5.3.1.1.1 Most critical assets in terms of causing loss of operability 
Figure 33 presents the cumulative degradation amounts of operability values of each 
Business Process. Each column is retrieved by giving a zero Self Effectiveness value to each asset 
and keeping others at 100, one by one, as similar to the previous analyses. In this network, there 
are four Business Process nodes. This graph presents the how many of the total of 400 utils 
(operability) of these four nodes are degraded in total. According to this figure, A3 is the most 
critical asset with the highest number, 215. A4, and A11 follows A3 with 193.  
 
 
Figure 33. Cumulative performance degradation of business process nodes caused by each failed 
asset 
 




5.3.1.1.2 Most critical assets in terms of causing cost of loss 
Another way to measure the criticality of the assets is comparing costs. According to Figure 
30, Figure 31, and Table 9, degradation of Asset 3 to zero Self Effectiveness causes the highest 
cost, more than $26 million. A4 and A11 follow A3 with almost $23 million while all the others 
fall below $18 million. Therefore, A3 is the most critical asset according the cost of loss it causes 
when it fails.  
Table 9. Business Process costs caused by degradation of each asset 
Zero- Cost B1 Cost B2 Cost B3 Cost B4 TOTAL 
COST 
A1  $ 2,027,731   $    663,844   $              -     $              -     $   2,691,575  
A2  $ 4,717,250   $ 4,236,642   $ 1,435,217   $ 1,315,801   $ 11,704,910  
A3  $ 2,891,123   $ 9,718,441   $ 6,986,804   $ 6,408,210   $ 26,004,580  
A4  $ 1,826,126   $ 8,970,869   $ 6,508,399   $ 5,968,861   $ 23,274,255  
A5  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
A6  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
A7  $ 1,521,529   $    498,780   $              -     $              -     $   2,020,309  
A8  $ 2,129,994   $ 2,491,509   $    956,811   $    877,575   $   6,455,890  
A9  $ 3,043,057   $    996,365   $              -     $              -     $   4,039,422  
A10  $ 4,260,718   $ 4,984,215   $ 1,914,235   $ 1,755,151   $ 12,914,319  
A11  $ 1,826,126   $ 8,970,869   $ 6,508,399   $ 5,968,861   $ 23,274,255  
A12  $              -     $ 2,990,290   $ 5,359,858   $ 2,809,140   $ 11,159,288  
A13  $ 6,086,845   $ 1,993,925   $              -     $              -     $   8,080,770  
A14  $ 2,434,592   $ 7,974,504   $ 3,828,470   $ 3,511,425   $ 17,748,991  
A15  $              -     $ 5,980,579   $ 4,594,164   $ 4,213,710   $ 14,788,453  
 





5.3.1.2 Scenarios where assets are randomly degraded  
Other scenarios have been analyzed where groups of two or three randomly selected assets 
fails at the same time. Figure 34 presents the cost caused by these scenarios. As it can be observed, 
as more assets fail, more cost increases. While the largest cost is almost $24 million for the 
scenarios that only one asset fails, it can be seen that the effect is more significant and reach more 
than $42 million when Assets 1, 2, and 3 fail at the same time. Another implication of this figure 
is that the first scenario in which A2 and A9 fail, Costs related to Business Processes 3 and 4, are 
lower than 1 and 2.  
 
Figure 34. Total cost caused by each failed group of assets 
 




5.3.2 Assess the impact of adding redundancy on resiliency 
5.3.2.1 Add a redundant asset (i.e. an asset with the same functionality with OR gate) 
In order to mitigate the risk associated with critical assets, a redundant node was added to 
function as the original node does. In this case, even if the original node fails for some reason 
internally or externally, the redundant node would continue its function and the dependent nodes’ 
operability would not be affected.  
The OR gate is used to add redundant nodes since it is the appropriate dependency type for 
this purpose. In a scenario below, a redundant node added to Asset 3, which is the most critical 
asset, and then in another scenario, redundancy is added for A1. The results are compared 
5.3.2.2 Add to A3 (A3.1 and A3.2) 
In this scenario, a redundant node is added to the most critical node, A3, as shown in Figure 
35. It is added with an OR gate. 
 





Figure 35. Modified network with redundancy added for A3 
 
The same analysis is conducted to compute the effect of degrading the nodes to zero to the 
total cost. According to the results presented in Table 10 when either of the original or redundant 
node’s Self Effectiveness is degraded to zero and all other nodes are kept at 100% operability, the 










Table 10. Effect of adding a redundant node for A3 on total cost 
Zero- Cost B1 Cost B2 Cost B3 Cost B4 TOTAL COST 
A3  $ 2,891,123   $ 9,718,441   $ 6,986,804   $ 6,408,210   $ 26,004,580  
A3.1  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
A3.2  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
 
5.3.2.3 Add to A1 (A1.1 and A1.2) 
In another scenario, a redundant node is added to another node, A1, as shown in Figure 36. 
It is added with an OR gate. 
 
 
Figure 36. Modified network with redundancy added for A1 
 




The same analysis is conducted to compute the effect of degrading the nodes to zero to the 
total cost. According to the results presented in Table 10 when either of the original or redundant 
node’s Self Effectiveness is degraded to zero and all other nodes are kept at 100% operability, it 
does not affect the Business Processes and causes no cost.  
When the same analysis is conducted, again, it is shown that after a redundant node is 
added to the topology, it does not affect the total cost only if the original and the redundant node 
do not fail simultaneously.  
 
Table 11. Effect of adding a redundant node for A1 on total cost 
Zero- Cost B1 Cost B2 Cost B3 Cost B4 TOTAL COST 
A1  $ 2,027,731   $    663,844   $              -     $              -     $   2,691,575  
A1.1  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
A1.2  $              -     $              -     $              -     $              -     $                -    
 
5.3.2.4 Compare the impact of adding a redundant node to A3 and A1 
The results of these two scenarios are also shown in Figure 37 in comparison to the other 
scenarios. It can be implied that adding a redundant node to A3 reduces the risk significantly, and 
this could be an important investment for decision makers to consider. 
 





Figure 37. Total cost caused by each failed asset and redundant nodes 
  




5.4 Case 3: Compare impact (cost) of attack and security/infrastructure investment 
scenarios 
5.4.1 Change system configuration (add a redundant node) 
As it is shown in Case 2, adding a redundant asset node to the network can be helpful to 
eliminate the criticality of a node since even the original asset fails the redundant asset still would 
be working. The probability of two systems fail simultaneously is lower than the probability of 
one of these systems to fail. This is apparent, but adding one more node costs, and decision makers 
need to make sure the investment would be beneficial. Suppose that adding one more node to the 
network costs $1 million. If the decision makers can analyze the network and find a node that if it 
fails, it would cost more than the cost of adding a replicate of it. Failure of Asset 3 costs more than 
26 million dollars. In this case, if another system that would continue working and providing the 
functionality of Asset 3, its benefit would be that much. Therefore, investing $1 million to add 
such a system to the network would be highly beneficial. 
5.4.2 Buy a security tool to prevent attack (Anti-virus, Host Based IDS etc.) 
Redundancy is not the only way to diminish the cost of loss. There are also ways to improve 
the reliability of the assets and reduce their vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity tools, such as Anti-virus 
programs may prevent an attack from happening or reduce the effect of an attack and keep 
operability of the asset above zero. Although partially degraded operability of an asset is not ideal, 
it is better than having the asset completely lost. Moreover, these tools would cost less than adding 
a redundant node from the investment point of view.  
Suppose that the enterprise considers buying a security tool that would decrease the amount 
of degradation when an attack happens. In this scenario, by investing $200K to an improvement, 
an asset will not degrade from 100 utils to 0, instead it will degrade to 50. 




Based on the results presented in Figure 38, investing in A3 and A4 returns well and the 
total costs are divided almost in half. Total cost by A3 reduces from more than $25 million to 
almost $13 million and Total cost by A4 reduces from almost $23 million to $12 million.  
 
Figure 38. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the full degradation 
scenarios 
5.4.3 Comparison of mitigation strategies 
The different approaches to risk mitigation allow us to select the most suitable solution for 
the network. It may be useful to be able to choose the appropriate method to mitigate the 
dependency risks of the specific critical nodes. Figure 39 presents the total costs of different 
scenarios, such as some specific assets are kept original, some redundancy added, or partially 
degraded with the employment of the security tools. As it can be observed, the original scenarios 
cost the largest amount. Degraded versions decrease the cost almost to the half. And redundancy 
resolves the issue. However, these scenarios only include situations where one asset failed at a 
time.  
 





Figure 39. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the redundancy 
scenarios 
 
The same scenarios are also compared in Figure 40 from the perspective of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability values. The general picture does not change in this graph since the 
average degradation cost for confidentiality is slightly higher than integrity and availability and 
their weights are kept constant during the analyses to make the comparison easier.  
 





Figure 40. Total cost caused by partially degraded assets in comparison with the redundancy 
scenarios with regards to CIA values 
 
5.5 Case 4: Risk Management Decision Making  
5.5.1 Risk management decision making                 
Different approaches to risk mitigation exist, and when it is combined with the large 
number of nodes and the dependency relations of the network topology, it becomes more 
complicated to find the best way to manage the risks of the enterprise network. There are four main 
strategies to manage the risks: risk acceptance, risk avoidance, risk control, and risk transfer. 
5.5.1.1 Risk acceptance 
Risk acceptance means that any consequences caused by the risk event are accepted. 
Therefore, no precaution is taken in this strategy. No investment is necessary to implement this 
strategy but possibly the consequences would be higher than other strategies.  




5.5.1.2 Risk avoidance 
The risk avoidance strategy is abandoning business processes that cause the risk. This 
strategy can be a good option for outdated processes, but it is not considered in this simulation as 
an option. 
5.5.1.3 Risk control 
Risk control is a strategy where some investment is done to take an action to reduce the 
risk by reducing either the likelihood or the impact of the risk event. This requires analyses and 
investment to be conducted but since the risk is reduced, there is a probability that the investment 
returns sooner or later. In this simulation the risk control methods are as follows: 
1. Buy a security tool to prevent attack (Anti-virus, Host Based IDS, etc.) 
2. Change system configuration (add a redundant node) 
5.5.1.4 Risk transfer (insurance)  
Transferring the risk is the last risk management strategy where the consequences of the 
risk event are transferred to another organization with some conditions.  
For this simulation, suppose that the enterprise is considering acquiring cyber insurance 
coverage. The intended amount for the cyber insurance to cover is $20 million. The deductible 
amount for this coverage is $2 million and the annual premium is $100,000.  
5.5.2 Scenarios for risk management strategies 
The scenarios to compare risk management strategies include a gradually propagated 
failure starting from no failed nodes and goes to the complete failure of the network. One more 
asset is failed at each consecutive scenario. 




5.5.2.1 Risk acceptance 
Figure 41 presents the total cost caused as a result of selection risk acceptance strategy. It 
starts with zero cost when there is no failed asset. There is no investment to mitigate the risks. 
There is no increase when A4 is added to the failed assets group since A11 has an AND 
dependency on A3 and A4. When A3 is already failed, there is no need for A4 to fail to effect A11, 
since it is already affected at a maximum rate.  
There is also no increase in cost when A5 fails in addition to the other nodes since A12 has 
an OR dependency on A5 and A6, meaning that unless both of them fail, A12 is not affected.  
The total cost in this strategy goes up to almost $50 million. 
 
 
Figure 41. Total costs for risk acceptance strategy 
 
5.5.2.2 Risk control 
The risk control strategy for this simulation includes buying a security tool for Asset 2 and 
Asset 4 and implementing redundancy for Asset 3. Therefore, in the scenario, Self Effectiveness 




of A2 and A4 degrades from 100 to 50 rather than 100 to 0 as for the other nodes. Also, when the 
original node A3.1 fails, the redundant node A3.2 continues working, and they are connected with 
an OR gate as conducted in Figure 35.  
The investment of a security tool for two nodes is $400,000 in total, and cost to add a 
redundant node is $500,000. Thus, there is a total investment amount of $900,000 even if no node 
failed as it can be observed in Figure 42.  
Failure of A3.1 does not affect the cost as explained, and it can be observed in Figure 42. 
The total cost for this strategy is almost $31 million, $19 million less than the risk acceptance 
strategy. 
 
Figure 42. Total costs for risk control strategy 
 
5.5.2.3 Risk transfer 
For this simulation, cyber insurance coverage is $20 million. The deductible amount is $2 
million, and the annual premium is $100,000. Therefore, any cost up to $2 million is paid by the 




enterprise; after that, any amount up to $20 million is covered by the insurance company. Any 
number above this is again paid by the enterprise. The total cost can be seen in Figure 43 with a 
gray line.  
5.5.2.4 Risk control and risk transfer 
As a final strategy for the simulation, risk control and risk transfer methods are combined 
and used simultaneously. The same precautions are made before the analysis starts, and the same 
coverage is applied when any cost occurred. The total cost can be seen in Figure 43 with a yellow 
line.  
5.5.3 Comparison of risk management strategies 
All risk management strategies are summarized and presented in Figure 43. At first glance, 
it is easy to indicate that the risk acceptance strategy causes significantly larger cost in most 
scenarios. If there is no risk of failure, it would be the best strategy, but this is almost never the 
case since there is commonly some risk events. The reason costs for other strategies are more than 
zero is that there is an investment amount or insurance premium paid in advance.  
For the first two scenarios where only A1 failed and both A1 and A2 failed, the risk transfer 
strategy is the best since the insurance covers most of the losses. If the decision makers predict 
failure propagation among the network would not get further, they would need to consider getting 
insurance coverage. The difference is at least $5 million from other strategies’ costs.  
Other scenarios where three or more of the nodes are failed because of the propagation 
causes more cost for all strategies. The risk control and transfer strategy is the best strategy for this 
kind of big scale attack. It causes almost $2 million less than the risk control strategy for each 
scenario at this scale.  





Figure 43. Comparison of risk management strategies 
 
The detailed results for the simulation are presented in Table 12. The first column indicates 
the degraded nodes for each scenario. For the control strategies, A2 and A4 are partially degraded 
(indicated with -D) and A3 has a dependent node that is not degraded. Only A3.1 degrades for the 
control strategies. As it can be seen, with a right strategy it is possible to save more than $20 








Table 12. Comparison of risk management strategies for each scenario 








None $                 - $      900,000 $      100,000 $   1,000,000 
A1 $   2,691,575 $   3,591,575 $   2,100,000 $   3,691,575 
A1, A2(-D) $ 15,778,781 $ 10,134,908 $   2,100,000 $   8,234,908 
A1, A2(-D), A3(.1) $ 42,717,939 $ 10,134,908 $ 24,817,939 $   8,234,908 
A1, A2(-D), A3(.1), A4(-D) $ 42,717,939 $ 21,646,179 $ 24,817,939 $ 19,746,179 
A1, A2(-D), A3(.1), A4(-D), A5 $ 42,717,939 $ 21,646,179 $ 24,817,939 $ 19,746,179 
A1, A2(-D), A3(.1), A4(-D), A5, A6 $ 50,057,834 $ 31,138,579 $ 32,157,834 $ 29,238,579 
 
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
Several simulations are run for sensitivity analysis on the architecture given in Figure 29. 
In Figures 44 to 51, total costs of degraded operability values of CIA components of Assets 
A1-A4 are plotted while all other operability values are kept fully operable. Horizontal axes of 
Figures 44 to 51 indicate the operability level of the indicated node’s CIA values and the vertical 
axes stand for total costs. In Figure 44, CIA values of four nodes, A1, A2, A3, and A4 are plotted. 
As it can be seen, degradation of the Integrity value of node A3 causes the largest cost, followed 
by Integrity values of nodes A4 and A2. The reason why degradation of the integrity values cost 
more than confidentiality and availability is that the feeder node’s operability of the integrity value 
can affect not only integrity value but also the integrity and availability values of the receiver 
nodes. 
 





Figure 44 Cost of degradation of C-I-A values of Asset 1 to 4 
 
Figure 45 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of CIA values of 
node A1. Total costs caused by confidentiality and availability degradation are negligible.  
 
Figure 45 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 1 
 




Figure 46 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of CIA values of 
node A2. Total costs caused by confidentiality and availability degradation are negligible. 
 
Figure 46 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 2 
 
Figure 47 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of CIA values of 
node A3. Total costs caused by confidentiality and availability degradation are relatively low. 
 
 




Figure 47 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 3 
 
Figure 48 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of CIA values of 
node A4. Total costs caused by confidentiality and availability degradation are relatively low. 
 
 
Figure 48 Operability level of C-I-A for Asset 4 
Figure 49 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of Confidentiality 
values of Assets A1-A4. Total costs caused by confidentiality level degradation of A3 and A4 are 
significantly higher than A1 and A2. 
 





Figure 49 Operability levels of Confidentiality values of Assets A1 to A4 
Figure 50 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of Integrity values 
of Assets A1-A4. Total costs caused by integrity level degradation of A3 and A4 are higher than 
A1 and A2. 
 
 
Figure 50 Operability levels of Integrity values of Assets A1 to A4 
 




Figure 51 plots the total costs caused by degradation of operability levels of Availability 
values of Assets A1-A4. Total costs caused by availability level degradation of A3 and A4 are 
higher than A1 and A2. 
 
Figure 51 Operability levels of Availabilty values of Assets A1 to A4 
  






6.1 High Level Summary of Findings 
This study aims to modify FDNA to develop FDNA-Cyber, which is a new quantitative 
modeling method to develop a quantitative model to determine the impact of propagation within a 
layer, develop a quantitative model to determine the impact propagation between different layers 
within an enterprise, and develop an approach to estimate the economic cost of a cyber incident or 
event. 
The innovations of this study are (a) introducing Self-Efficiency of nodes, (b) Integrating 
Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability values to nodes, (c) new dependency relations (AND 
and OR dependecies). Another innovation of the study is calculating the impact in monetary values 
by considering time of the cyber action and duration of the event or incident as two of the 
parameters.  
6.2 Significance of the Study 
The proposed research has several contributions in the fields of cybersecurity and 
engineering management. The contributions of the research are examined under the following 
categories: (a) Risk Management, (b) System Resiliency, (c) Security Economics. 
a) Risk Management 
The proposed research contributes to the field of risk management in two areas: risk 
analysis and risk communication. 
Risk Analysis: According to Society of Risk Analysis (Aven et al., 2015), risk analysis is 
defined as “Systematic process to comprehend the nature of risk and to express the risk, with the 
available knowledge”. Kaplan and Garrick (1981) define risk in the following formula. 




Risk = Probability of a loss event X Magnitude of loss 
Consequences or impact are another concept used interchangeably with “Magnitude of 
loss”. Most of the current studies just consider the impact at the asset layer and ignore impact on 
services and business processes. The studies which consider the other layers alongside asset layer 
do not handle the vertical and horizontal dependencies (Shameli-Sendi et al., 2016), so the 
proposed research will contribute to calculation of risk analysis by providing a more accurate value 
of “Magnitude of loss”. 
Risk Communication: According to Society of Risk Analysis (Aven et al., 2015), risk 
communication is defined as “Exchange or sharing of risk-related data, information and knowledge 
between and among different target groups (such as regulators, stakeholders, consumers, media, 
general public)”.  
The language of communication between cybersecurity decision makers at different layers 
of an organization varies. Decision making in cybersecurity, as similar to many other areas, is 
accomplished in three levels: tactical, operational and strategic. In the tactical level, capabilities of 
cybersecurity experts heavily depend on rapidly converting existing knowledge into practical 
problem solving efforts in complex IT environments. All of the security operations, like hardening 
IT systems, conducting penetration tests, managing IT security products, etc. can be achieved by 
having a high level of hands-on expertise and problem solving capability. Decision makers of the 
operational level need to manage cybersecurity under the technical, legal and organizational 
constraints so that training them requires work on cases covering the various combination of these 
aspects. Decision makers of the strategic level should understand the possible effects of cyber 
threats to the pursued mission and strategic objectives. 




Risk analysis can provide common ground for all levels of decision making if a common 
understanding of risk is established. Senior level decision makers want to hear risk analysis results 
from a strategic point of view. This is possible by presenting impact with meaningful values, 
mission impact or impact on business processes not impact individual assets. However, technical 
level decision makers are more focused on the impact at the asset level, so the holistic impact 
calculation approach of the proposed research provides a common ground for all levels of decision 
makers in an organization, improves risk communication, and enhances well-informed decision 
making. 
 
b) System Resiliency 
The Society of Risk Analysis provides the following definitions for resiliency (Aven et al., 
2015): “Probability that a system can sustain its functionality in the face of high stress or 
(unexpected) disturbances” or “Probability that a system can restore functionality to its pre-disaster 
level (or higher) within a specified time”. 
The proposed research will help to identify the asset nodes that might produce the 
maximum impact on a business process or mission. To have a resilient system, redundant nodes 
can be added to the system to mitigate degradation caused by this most critical assets. Another 
application of resilient system engineering can be using simulation techniques to measure the cyber 
resiliency level of a system while architecting it. 
c) Security Economics 
Cybersecurity Investment 
Cyber risk has become a top agenda item for businesses all over the world and is listed as 
one of the top three global risks with significant economic implications for businesses (Allianz, 




2016). In fact, cybersecurity rating of companies is an emerging consideration in investment 
assessments (Bloomberg, 2014). Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) are playing more 
important roles in company’s’ managerial boards as they are not only responsible for securing 
organizations from cyber threats but also providing strategic guidance to other board members 
especially on the effectiveness and efficiency of cybersecurity investments. Board relies on CISOs 
for information about the company’s cybersecurity posture in a language they understand – risk, 
cost, and benefits – and how cyber risk maps to dollars instead of the latest purchase of an IT 
security product (Rifai, 2017). To transform cyber risk management from a technical issue to a 
business issue cyber risk has to eventually be quantified as monetary value. As well, valuation of 
cyber risk will be integrated into Enterprise Risk Management frameworks (Ruan, 2017) 
eventually. Consequently, cyber risk management has become an emerging and vital part of the 
enterprise risk management. 
Since the proposed method will calculate the impact of cyber incidents and events in 
monetary value, C-level managers can make better decisions to manage cyber risks and choose the 
economically most convenient risk management strategy (i.e. acceptance, avoidance, transfer or 
mitigation). 
Cyber Insurance 
To respond to cyber threats via risk transfer, the cyber insurance market is also emerging 
all over the world, including the U.S. According to AON (2017), the global stand-alone cyber 
market had $1.7bn in annual gross written premium in 2015 and increased to $2.3bn in 2016 and 
is expected to reach $5.6bn in 2020. There are 70 insurers offering the standalone cyber product 
in the U.S.  




One of the main issues of cyber risk insurance is lack of ability of accurate cyber risk 
calculation particularly in economic terms. The holistic impact calculation method also provides a 
solution to the underinsurance problem. 
6.3 Future Research 
Future research which can enhance or extend this research includes: (a) extending the 
FDNA –Cyber model to cover dependency relations in a supply chain network, (b) integrating 
attack propagation at Asset layer with the functional dependencies at Asset layer, (c) extending 
FDNA-Cyber to have stochastic approach while modeling dependencies, and (d) developing 
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